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Abstract  
 
 
 
This thesis aims to explain how and why the representations of transit forced migrants 
in Indonesian major print media were vastly different within two time spans: (1) 
during the arrivals of the Indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 and (2) in the period of 
the new generations of refugees from Middle Eastern and South Asian countries in 
1997-2013. Employing media content analysis of 216 news articles from three major 
print media in Indonesia, this study found out that the Indochinese refugees were 
portrayed with positive labels and thus, mainly discussed in connection with the non-
security theme. In contrast, the new generations of forced migrants were portrayed 
with negative labels such as ‘illegal immigrants’ and were framed as security threats. 
Grounded within Securitization Theory, this thesis thus argues that the changing 
representations were caused by the securitizing move made by specialized agencies in 
Indonesia. Additionally, this study took one further step by questioning: why were the 
Indochinese refugees not securitized? And why were the new generations of refugees 
securitized? To provide answers for these questions, this thesis employs theoretical 
thematic analysis concentrating on subconscious drivers and cost-benefit calculations 
that lead to the actors’ decision to securitize or not to securitize the forced migrants.  
 
Keywords: transit forced migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, media representations, 
Securitization Theory, Indonesia.   
Words: 20,116 	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“If ASEAN countries refuse to provide protection 
for refugees then the third countries will use it as 
an excuse for not receiving the refugees.” 1 
 
(Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs on 
Kompas newspaper, 14 July 1979) 
 
“They are illegal immigrants. Should we let them 
come in, even when our law does not allow it?”2 
 
(Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs on Tempo 
magazine, 9 September 2001) 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
These statements commenting on transit forced migrants by two different 
Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministers from two different periods of time provide 
an excellent illustration of the changes in the way the Indonesian government 
labels asylum seekers and refugees in media. During 1975-1996, Indonesia hosted 
hundreds of thousands of Indochinese refugees. After this period, Indonesia has 
been receiving much smaller, but steadily increasing, numbers of Middle Eastern 
and South Asian forced migrants. The first statement used ‘refugees’ to represent 
people who flee their home country due to political instability and conflict. In line 
with this label, the government also discussed the issue of protection. The second 
quotation shows how recent forced migrants are labeled as ‘illegal immigrants’. 
Thus, their attempt to anchor their boats in Indonesian soil should be prohibited.  
These news extracts imply that the representations of forced migrants in 
the Indonesian major print media have changed. How immigrants are perceived in 
receiving or transit countries has become a central issue in the academic world as 
well as in the realm of immigration policy. Categorizing immigrants contributes 
to differential treatments among them as the different terms have social and 
political implications for people who are labeled within those categorizations 
(Brun 2010: 337). Moreover, ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’ have different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The original text is in Indonesian language. The text was translated as accurate 
as possible.  2	  The original text is in Indonesian language. The text was translated as accurate 
as possible. 	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meanings compared to ‘illegal migrants,’ with the last term usually having a 
criminal connotation (Koser 2006: 44).  
Previous studies about how refugees and asylum seekers are perceived 
negatively by hosting countries have been mainly conducted in relation to 
Western countries. Those studies predominantly discuss how media and the 
government represent refugees and asylum seekers negatively – as a security 
threat (Esse et al. 2013; Gilbert 2013). Khosravinik (2009) shows that the 
representations of refugees and asylum seekers can change in different socio-
historical settings, though he does not aim to explain the crucial question of why 
representations of forced migrants changed. Studying the changes can contribute 
to knowledge on the possible socio-political drivers behind the changes, thus 
providing a more comprehensive picture on the nexus between media 
representations and transit forced migrants.  
This thesis will try to fill this gap by not only analyzing how the 
representations have changed, but also by seeking explanations on the causes of 
these changes. Additionally, this thesis will also fill out another research gap, 
which is the representation of forced migrants in a transit state – since issues of 
border controls, asylum seekers management, and immigration policies’ transfers 
from Australia to Indonesia have otherwise been dominating studies about 
refugees and asylum seekers in Indonesia (e.g. Missbach 2013; Kneebone 2014; 
Nethery and Gordyn 2013).   
 
1.1.    Purpose and Research Questions 
The aim of this thesis is to explain how and why the portrayals of transit forced 
migrants in Indonesian major print media changed after the end of the 
Indochinese refugees’ arrivals. This study’s aim was generated based upon an 
initial pilot testing of the materials that show the changes (see 4.2). In order to 
achieve this aim, the research questions are:  
• How did the representations of transit forced migrants in Indonesian major 
print media differ from the time of the Indochinese refugees’ arrival in 
1975-1996 to the time of the new generation of refugees in 1997-2013?  
• Why were the representations of transit forced migrants in those two time 
spans different?    
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1.2. Terminologies  
This section provides brief explanations on some key terms that will regularly 
appear in this thesis. Forced migrants could be perceived as persons who leave 
their places of origin due to involuntary reasons, such as to escape persecution, 
torture or armed conflicts. They differ from voluntary migrants who often have 
economic motivations to migrate (Castles and Miller 2009: 188). However, it is 
important to bear in mind that the strict division between economic motivation 
and humanitarian motivation is very difficult to be demarcated since in many 
cases migrants’ motivations are mixed.  
Included within forced migrants are internally displaced persons (IDPs), 
refugees, and asylum seekers. IDPs are people who move because of involuntary 
reasons, yet remain within their country’s borders (Castles and Miller 2009). 
Refugees are defined as people who escape from their home country due to “well-
founded fear of being persecuted” (UNHCR 2009: 4). This definition was taken 
by UNHCR from the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees. Asylum 
seekers refer to people who seek protection from persecution by fleeing their 
home country, but their refugees’ applications are not yet finalized. In this thesis, 
the term of forced migrants is used interchangeably with refugees and asylum 
seekers when it discusses the migrants in the context of ‘involuntary’ migrations. 
In addition, this thesis only discuss international forced migrants, therefore the 
term of forced migrants used in this thesis excludes IDPs.  
When refugees are already granted permits to move to countries that 
provide long-term protection, this process is called resettlement (Castles and 
Miller 2009: 189). In contrast, if refugees’ applications are denied they will be 
repatriated, which means that they will be sent back to their country of origins. 
Refugees and asylum seekers might also be called boat people in relation to the 
form of transportation they use in seeking entry into a transit or destination 
country’s territory.  
By definition, transit state refers to a state that is located in between the 
sending countries and the receiving countries or “at the crossroad of the first and 
third world” (Kimball 2007 cited in Sahin-Mencutek 2012: 142). The transit 
forced migrants in this thesis context means that the migrants did not actually 
intend to stay in Indonesia, but rather used Indonesia as a stepping stone while 
awaiting their resettlement in a developed country, such as Australia. 
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Additionally, up until the time of this thesis writing, Indonesia still has not ratified 
the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees, which means the Indonesian 
government will not grant refugee status for foreign applicants and also will not 
offer permanent settlements for refugees in Indonesia. However, the Indonesian 
government allows United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
to open an office in Indonesia and take care of refugees’ applications. 
 
1.3. Previous Studies 
Studies related to this thesis can be divided into three specific themes. First, the 
representation of transit forced migrants within mass media in hosting countries. 
Second, the securitization of forced migrants, and lastly, the studies of transit 
forced migrants in Indonesia.  
 
1.3.1. Forced Migrants’ Representations 
Based on the characteristics of the forced migrants’ spatial movements, some 
scholars have researched IDPs (e.g. Duncan, 2005; Brun 2010). Other scholars are 
more interested in shedding some light on the concept of international refugees 
and their relations to the hosting communities (e.g. Codjoe et al. 2013; Agblorti 
2011). In the context of the latter, themes of hostilities within hosting countries 
towards international forced migrants have gained scholars’ attention in the past 
decade. These studies show that it is not unusual that the receiving countries 
portrayed asylum seekers as ‘illegal immigrants’.  
During the last decade, according to Esse et al. (2013), Western countries 
have had a tendency to see refugees and immigrants from a negative point of view 
– a tendency largely influenced by the media. Media in Western countries “focus 
on the threat that refugees and immigrants pose to the members of the host 
societies” (Esse et al. 2013: 520). Drawing upon a Canadian case, they bring up 
some themes that are usually used to portray forced migrants negatively, such as 
“spreading infectious disease”, “bogus claims”, and “terrorists may gain entry to 
Western countries” (Esse et al. 2013). Gilbert (2013) also confirms similar 
representations of Mexican refugees within local media in Canada.  
Mass media, according to Kushner (2003: 259), might not always produce 
antipathy toward asylum seekers, but most likely it has a significant contribution 
to “reinforce” the antipathy. In line with Kushner´s view, Bleiker et al. (2013: 
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399) argue that representations in media “are crucial because all knowledge of 
political issues is unavoidably and inherently mediated”. In other words, this view 
underlines the importance of media in the study of forced migration.   
In the Australian context, Klocker and Dunn (2003) highlight that negative 
media representations of asylum seekers are in line with the negative ‘themes’ 
produced by the government officials, such as the uses of words of ‘threat’, 
‘other’, ‘illegal’, and ‘burden’ when discussing refugees. Innes (2010: 457), in 
addition, understands categorizations of ‘genuine asylum seekers’, ‘economic 
migrants’, ‘bogus asylum seekers’, and ‘illegal immigrants’ as an effort to 
construct asylum seekers who are, in reality vulnerable, as a threat to the hosting 
states. She furthermore emphasizes that the dominant narrations of threats 
attached to the asylum seekers in Britain’s case are: (1) traditional physical threat, 
(2) economic threat, and (3) societal threat (Innes 2010).  
Other studies have concluded that the representations of asylum seekers 
are not static, but change according to particular social-political settings. 
Khosravinik, for example, conducted a critical discourse analysis of newspaper 
articles in the UK from 1996 to 2006 that contained two significant incidents, 
namely (1) the Balkan conflict in 1999 and (2) the British general election in 
2005. The findings demonstrated that during the Balkan conflict, the general 
representations of refugees in British newspapers were allegedly positive. The 
forced migrants were portrayed as “victims”, “powerless”, and “helpless” 
(Khosravinik 2009:  484). However, those positive representations of forced 
migrants contrast strongly with the period around the British general election in 
2005. During that time, asylum seekers and immigrants were portrayed as 
participating in “asocial” or “negative actions” (Khosravinik 2009: 488).  
McKay, Thomas, and Blood (2011) also touch upon different 
representations of refugees and asylum seekers in Australia during three different 
time spans: the wave of Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s, the arrival of 
Cambodian refugees in the late 1980s, and the third waves of refugees after the 
1990s. The last group was mainly labeled as “queue jumpers”, “illegal asylum 
seekers”, and “illegal immigrants” (McKay et al. 2011: 609).  However, McKay 
et al.’s work did not focus on the changing patterns in how the refugees and 
asylum seekers were represented. Instead, they only focused on the 
representations of asylum seekers in one time span during an incident of a boat 
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transporting refugees that exploded in north coast of Australia in 2008. Therefore, 
McKay et al.’s and Khosravinik’s findings are unable to illuminate why the shift 
in refugee representations occurred. This thesis will fill this gap by analyzing the 
factors that can explain the changes in refugees´ representation in Indonesian.  
In addition, the vast majority of research on negative representations of 
refugees and asylum seekers has been conducted in relation to Western countries, 
which are destination countries for refugees and asylum seekers. Fewer studies 
take place in transit countries, such as in Turkey (Sahin-Mencutek 2012) and 
Jordan (Chaterlard 2002). Those studies mainly focus on the government´s 
policies on transit forced migrants. As an exception, a study about Iraqi refugees 
in Jordan also touched upon how some parts of local communities despise the 
presence of transit forced migrants – yet they still use the terminology of ‘guests’ 
instead of ‘refugees’, or other negatively nuanced labels (Nanes 2007). This thesis 
thus contributes to this ‘niche’, since forced migrants in transit countries are 
understudied compared to the research conducted in Western settings.  
 
1.3.2. Securitization of Forced Migrants 
The issues of forced migration or irregular migration have also attracted scholars 
in the field of security studies. The arrival of undocumented immigrants and 
asylum seekers in the late 1980s in Western countries resulted in migration being 
framed as a security issue (Castles and Miller, 2009: 209). Nyberg-Sorensen 
(2012) argues that migration is often framed as a security risk that is connected to 
“global mafias, organized crime [….] Islamic radicalism, terrorism, urban 
violence, and or other ills” (2012: 66). This migration-security nexus was 
furthermore triggered by the series of terrorist attacks: the 9/11 attacks in the USA 
followed by other incidents in Spain in 2004 and the UK in 2005 (Isotalo, 2009 
cited in Nyberg-Sorensen, 2012: 66).  
In the study of the migration-security nexus, Securitization Theory – 
mainly connected to the Copenhagen School’s scholars – has been widely used to 
explain how undocumented migration has been framed as a security threat (e.g. 
Watson 2009; Hammerstad 2012; Hammerstad 2014). This theory views security 
threats as socially constructed and consequently, rejects the realist understanding 
of objective threats, furthering the possibility of widening the security concept. 
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Securitization Theory is useful to illustrate how a once non-politicized or 
politicized issue can then become securitized (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-24).  
Hammerstad (2012) criticizes the Copenhagen School’s Securitization 
Theory that highlights political elites or the government to be the most important 
securitizing actors. Drawing upon a case of a South African policy towards 
Zimbabwean migrants, Hammerstad explores “securitization from below”, which 
emphasizes members of grassroots movements as relevant actors in securitizing 
migrants. 
Watson (2009) conducted media research in order to show how 
humanitarian migration has been securitized in Canada and Australia. Hass (2010) 
goes one step further and argues that media’s role could be significant in 
securitization. Hass did not focus on the securitization of migrants but used the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study. The media, according to Hass, can play 
three roles: (1) media can act as a platform for ‘speech acts’; (2) media can made 
itself perform ‘speech acts’; and (3) media can act as watchdog when securitizing 
moves are accelerated (Hass, 2010: 84).  
In developing countries, securitization of migration has not yet gained 
wide attention. Arifianto (2009: 614) argues that, “fewer studies exist on the 
securitization of migration in developing countries.” His research focuses on how 
Malaysian elites securitized migrants who came from Indonesia and how the 
Indonesian government reacted to those securitizing moves.  
 
1.3.3. Forced Migrants in Indonesia 
Indonesia has also received attention from scholars who are interested in 
explaining the problem of transit forced migrants. However, these studies mainly 
explain how the Australian government was able to influence Indonesian 
government policies so that Indonesia could ‘filter’ refugees and asylum seekers 
through tougher immigration policies. Kneebone (2014) underlines the success of 
the Australian government in securitizing forced migration issues within the Asia-
Pacific region through the Bali Process that was initiated by the Indonesian 
government and the Australian government a decade ago. 
Besides the influence on the regional level, there were also efforts from 
the Australian government to influence Indonesia’s immigration policies through 
aid and diplomacy (Nethery et al. 2012). Nethery and Gordyn (2013) utilize the 
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concept of “incentivized policy transfer” to explain how the Indonesian 
government adopted Australia’s policies in (1) detention centers and (2) through 
connecting the issue of forced migrants with people smuggling. In addition, 
Taylor and Raffety-Brown (2010) underline the impact of Australia’s policy 
transfer to Indonesia in regards to the refugee assessment process. 
Antje Missbach focuses her research on Indonesia’s border control and 
asylum seekers nexus (Missbach and Sinanu 2011; Missbach 2013; Missbach 
2014). Similar to aforementioned research, Missbach also underlines the changes 
in Indonesia’s immigration policies towards transit asylum seekers. Missbach´s 
article “Waiting on the Island of ‘Stuckedness’: Managing Asylum Seekers in 
Island Detention Camps in Indonesia from the Late 1970s to the Early 2000s” 
provides insightful analysis on Indonesian government policies during those two 
different time spans; the time of Vietnamese forced migrants in 1970s and the 
Middle East forced migrants in early 2000.  
However, instead of focusing on the differences, Missbach approaches the 
issue from the similarity in managing asylum seekers through the use of “island 
detention centers”. She mentions briefly the reasons for a more reluctant stance of 
the Indonesian government to handle forced migrants during the post-Vietnamese 
refugee arrivals, which are due to the lack of political will and also lack of 
funding (Missbach 2013: 297). However, those two reasons somehow simplify 
the changes. Immediate questions revolving around those arguments surfaced – 
for example, why the political will of the Indonesian government changed after 
the end of Vietnamese forced migrants’ arrivals. In that sense, the arguments need 
further investigation.  
This thesis could contribute to filling in research gaps within the studies of 
forced migration and security in two ways. First, it provides a chance to employ 
Securitization Theory in a non-Western setting. Second, it can also illuminate the 
shifts of representations of forced migrants in different socio-political settings and 
further explain the factors that motivate the changes.  
 
1.4.    Arguments  
The literature review, a pilot study (see 4.2), and the theoretical framework (see 
3.3) have guided this thesis into an initial understanding of how to answer the 
research questions. This writing contains three interconnected contentions. First, 
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the way refugees and asylum seekers are portrayed in the major print media has 
become more hostile after the end of the Indochinese forced migrants’ arrivals. 
Second, the changes arguably occurred due to the securitizing move made by 
Indonesian government officials. In this case, media reports can serve as an 
indication to see the actors´ moves. Third, the motivation of actors to securitize or 
not to securitize transit forced migrants can be explained through the notions of 
subconscious drivers and cost-benefit calculations (Karyotis  2012).  
 
1.5. Structure of Thesis  
This thesis is structured into eleven chapters. The first chapter provides 
introduction. The second chapter gives a background on international transit 
forced migrants in Indonesia. The third chapter explains the theoretical framework 
that guides this thesis. The fourth chapter presents the methods that will be used, 
while the fifth chapter illustrates the media analysis of the representations of 
refugees and asylum seekers in Indonesia’s media in two different time spans: the 
period of Indochinese refugees´ arrivals (1975-1996) and the period of new 
generations of forced migrants (1997-2013). This chapter also provides analysis 
behind the meaning of the changing representations. Chapters six and seven will 
present analysis on the factors that can explain the shifts of representations. 
Chapter eight provides brief arguments to connect chapters six and seven. Chapter 
nine will provide a conclusion of the study while chapter ten will summarize the 
bibliography of this thesis. Chapter eleven consists of appendices.  
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2. International Forced Migrants in Indonesia  
 
This chapter consists of background information on the international forced 
migrants that came to Indonesia within the two different time spans. The first 
section concerns the Indochinese forced migrants within the time period of 1975-
1996, while the second section concerns the new generation of forced migrants 
that came to Indonesia in the period of 1997-2013.   
 
2.1.     Indochinese Forced Migrants  
The end of Vietnam War in 1975 was marked by the victory of the communist 
regime that caused massive outflows of Vietnamese-Chinese descendants who 
resisted the communist ideology. Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia were three 
countries in Southeast Asia that received the biggest number of Vietnamese 
refugees (see Table 1). Those countries were considered a transit location for the 
refugees who intended to stay in developed countries.  
  According to an Indonesian historian, Asvi Marwan Adam, the inflows of 
Indochinese refugees to Indonesia can be divided into three periods (Swastiwi et 
al. 2012: 10). First, the 1975-1978 period, which was dominated by the use of 
refugee camps on several Indonesian islands. Second, the period of 1979-1989 
was marked by the establishment of a refugee camp on Galang Island. 
Additionally, this period was also characterized by the relaxed terms in allocating 
refugee status. Lastly followed the period of 1989-1996, where forced migrants 
had to face stricter screening processes. Missbach (2013: 292) notes that after 
June 1989, refugee status, while initially granted to all of the Indochinese forced 
migrants, started to become assessed on an individual basis. In this sense, each 
asylum seeker had to provide evidence of his/her claim. A person who failed to 
provide substantial evidence would face repatriation. 
The first group of Indochinese forced migrants that transited through 
Indonesia was recorded on 19th May 1975, which consisted of 92 people who 
continued their journey to Singapore (Fandik 2013: 166). On 22nd May 1975, a 
boat that carried 25 refugees anchored at North Natuna Island, Indonesia 
(Ismayawati 2013). In the first quarter of 1979, the arrival of refugees to 
Indonesia rocketed to about 40,000 people. In comparison, however, the number 
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of Indochinese refugees in Indonesia was a mere 2,800 people in 1978  
(Ismayawati 2013: 14).  
 
Table 1 
Indochinese Refugees’ Arrivals by Boat in Countries of First Asylum  
1975-1995 
Countries 1975-
1979 
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1995 Accumulation 
Malaysia 124,103 76,205 52,860 1,327 254,495 
Hong Kong 79,906 28,975 59,518 27,434 195,833 
Indonesia 51,156 36,208 19,070 15,274 121,708 
Thailand* 25,723 52,468 29,850 9,280 117,321 
Others 30,538 48,139 25,200 3,076 106,953 
Total 311,426 241,995 186,498 56,391 796,310 
Source: UNHCR (2000: 98) 
*Thailand received higher overland Indochinese refugees that reached 640,246 
people in total from 1975-1995 
 
Within the same year, the Indonesian government also offered Galang 
Island as a refugee processing camp. The idea was warmly welcomed by those 
states in the international community who ended up donating money for the 
establishment and operational costs of the processing camp. This movement 
resulted in the international community applauding the ‘humanistic’ approach of 
the Indonesian government towards the transit forced migrants (Kompas, 
19/06/1996). Initially, Galang Island Refugees´ Camp was proposed to only last 
for 2-3 years from the first time it was established in 1979 (Kompas, 24/07/1981). 
However, it took 17 years before the Indonesian government closed the camp in 
August 1996. From the 121,708 refugees that transited in Indonesia, 111,876 of 
them were resettled in third countries – with the vast majority of the refugees 
being resettled in the USA (Ismayawati 2013: 190).  A few months before the 
closing of the refugee camp, the Indonesian government established a 
humanitarian military operation to repatriate asylum seekers who did not pass the 
selection process. During the operation from June 1996 to September 1996, the 
military sent 4,570 asylum seekers back to Vietnam. The UNHCR praised the 
operation for using persuasive approaches (Pusat Sejarah TNI 2007: 4).   
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2.2.    The New Waves of Forced Migrants  
Not too long after having dealt with the influx episode of the Indochinese forced 
migrants, Indonesia started to receive new generations of forced migrants who 
mainly came from Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and South Asian countries, 
such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Sri Lanka. The first inflow of forced migrants 
from Afghanistan and Iran that arrived in Indonesia was recorded in 1996, of 
which, all 12 forced migrants used air flight (Missbach 2013). The number of 
asylum seekers arriving in Indonesia began to increase between late 2000 and 
2002, where after it began to decrease between 2003 and 2008 (UNHCR 2015). 
Since 2009, however, the numbers of asylum seekers and refugees have steadily 
increased once more (see Table 2).  
Unlike the Indochinese refugees who gained widespread public attention 
within Indonesia due to their significant volume in 1979, the new waves of forced 
migrants only began receiving attention after the MV Tampa incident at the end of 
August 2001. The Australian conservative government rejected a request by MV 
Tampa – a Norwegian ship – to dock in Australia. This was due to the ship having 
rescued 438 forced migrants that sought to claim asylum in Australia. These 
migrants were initially travelling via an Indonesian ship that had sunk in the sea 
(McKay et al. 2011). This incident created diplomatic tension between Australia 
and Indonesia because both countries refused to receive the forced migrants.  
Table 2 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Indonesia 
2006-2013 
 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Refugees 301 315 369 798 811 1,006 1,819 3,206 
Asylum 
Seekers 
265 211 353 1,769 2,071 3,233 6,126 7,110 
Returned 
Refugees 
0 0 1 311 0 0 35 0 
Others 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
People on 
Concern 
566 526 726 2,878 2,882 4,239 7,980 10,316 
Source: UNHCR (2007-2014)  
In contrast to the Indochinese refugees who were centralized on Galang 
Island, the ‘new generations’ of forced migrants live in several cities in Indonesia. 
Some of them have to stay in immigration detention centers while others can stay 
in cheap hotels or rent rooms or houses from local residents. The majority of 
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forced migrants that are allowed to live in open detention centers stay in Bogor, 
West Java, in Riau, Sumatera Island, or in Makassar, Sulawesi Island. The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) provides funding for food for 
refugees and asylum seekers who are detained in immigration detention centers at 
a cost of 15,000-25,000 IDR (1.5 to 2.5 USD) per person per day (Nethery et al. 
2012: 102). 
Forced migrants living outside the immigration detention center also get a 
monthly living allowance from the IOM or from other international organizations. 
Refugees and asylum seekers have to sign a certificate declaring their compliance 
before they are allowed to live outside immigration detention centers. The 
declaration consists of five points, including: “the refugees should stay within 
specific area designated by the Directorate General of Immigration; refugees are 
not allowed to be at the airport or seaport unless accompanied by an immigration 
officer, […] and refugees should report to Immigration every two weeks for 
purposes of registering their presence” (Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Imigrasi 
Nomor IMI-1489.UM.08.05). 
     Evidently, the Indonesian government responds to this new wave of forced 
migrants differently from the previous generations of forced migrants. No one 
specific institution was appointed to coordinate the management of forced 
migrants, unlike during the inflow of the Indochinese refugees previously. 
However, for the new waves, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Law, and 
Security Affairs establishes an ad-hoc team on a yearly basis to handle migrant 
issues. The team consists of several institutions under the umbrella of “People 
Smuggling, Refugees, and Asylum Seekers Task Force” (Keputusan 
Menkopolhukam Kep-10/Menko/Polhukan/2013).  
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3. Theoretical Framework 
 
This theoretical framework discusses the nexus between media representations 
and securitization of transit forced migrants. Establishing the link between those 
issues is critical in order to provide a theoretical foundation to answer the research 
questions of: how and why the portrayal of forced migrants in the Indonesian 
major print media changed between two different time spans. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that this thesis employs Securitization Theory to 
illuminate the portrayal of forced migrants, and not the other way around. This 
chapter is divided into three connected sections. The first section explains a media 
representation theory that provides a foundation to understanding what media 
representation means and how this, in turn, affects the forced migrants’ changing 
portrayal in media. The second part discusses Securitization Theory: key 
concepts, some critiques, and also how this theory can be useful in this study. The 
last part talks about actors´ motivations to securitize or not to securitize an issue.  
 
3.1. Media Representations 
Media has been an important part of human communication for centuries. It 
provides people with information, whether in the forms of texts, moving images 
or still images. The way media portrays social groups, whether in connection with 
their sexes, races, religions or origins, is the primary concern of media 
representation theory (Levisen and Wien 2011). According to Chavez (2001), 
media representation is closely connected to the construction of meaning. 
Utilizing Hall’s notion of representation, he underlines that people “use symbols 
to communicate, or represent what we want to say about our feelings, beliefs, 
concept, plans, etc” (Chavez 2001: 34). In this sense, text of news articles do not 
merely consist of passive or neutral symbols or words; rather, they actively 
produce and convey ‘messages’. How media represents forced migrants has 
implications for the public perception of the reality of who forced migrants are 
and thus, how to treat them.  
On one hand, public “discourse” influences media; on the other hand, 
media, in turn, influences the public through its role in reconstructing and 
developing “discourse” (Petersson 2006: 41). The former argument is in line with 
Geraghty’s (2000: 368) point of view on the importance of the media´s role in 
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making “realistic representations”. Geraghty furthermore argues that the 
representations will only work when they confirm with the audience’s 
understanding of the object being represented. In a very extreme example, when 
the media represents a pigeon as a dangerous and life threatening animal, the 
audience might refuse to accept those representations if society, in general, 
perceives the pigeon as a friendly and adorable animal. However, when the 
audience, hypothetically speaking, already believes in the possibility of the pigeon 
as a vector of Avian Influenza – a deadly virus – they might accept the 
representations of the pigeon as dangerous.   
Media representations of a particular social group, for example, are not 
equal to the “true nature” of the group being portrayed, since media 
representations are inevitably social construction. Moreover, Edgar and Sedgwick 
(2002) argue that representations have nothing to do with the interests of the 
represented groups or how the groups expect to be portrayed. A group, according 
to these scholars, "can be represented in a manner that might be conceived as 
stereotyping them" (Edgar and Sedgwick 2002: 339). This argument fits well into 
the context of transit forced migrants. It is not in the interests of forced migrants 
to be represented as ‘outsiders’ or ‘illegal immigrants’. Instead, those 
representations pose as stereotypes that might jeopardize migrants’ interests. 
Therefore, what triggers media to represent something as they represent it? Does 
it reflect society’s understanding of certain realities?   
Krzyzanowski and Wodak (2009) cited in Busch and Krzyzanowski 
(2012: 279) argue that several studies have shown the connection between media 
representations and political agenda on the issue of migration and asylum seekers. 
The argument is based upon the understanding of a “chain of 
recontextualizations” in which the media and politics have dual directional 
relations. First, political discourses are taken by media through politicians’ 
statements or speeches. Second, discourses in the media are used by politicians 
(Bernstein 1990; Wodak 2000 cited in Busch and Krzyzanowski 2012: 279).    
In connection to this thesis, I will argue that the media representations of 
transit forced migrants were influenced by the political agendas of elites. Elites in 
this context are a group of governmental institutions. The argument is based upon 
the fact that in this particular topic, the government’s voice within the media is 
dominant. Thus, it played an important role in constructing the image of refugees 
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and asylum seekers – whether to frame it in the context of humanitarian policy or 
in the context of security strategy. In order to establish this argument, this thesis 
will need help from Securitization Theory.  
 
3.2. Securitization Theory  
The previous section in this chapter has led to two understandings: what is 
represented in the media is the construction of reality, and that media 
representations can arguably be influenced by political agendas which can 
construct an issue as a security problem. In that regard, Securitization Theory is 
helpful for this study in two ways: (1) it enables one to situate the issue of transit 
forced migrants in either the realm of security or non-security, and (2) it allows 
one to identify when an issue has or has not been securitized.  
Securitization has become one of the prominent theories of security 
studies in the last few decades. This theory is closely associated with a group of 
scholars referred to as the ‘Copenhagen School’, which consists of Buzan, 
Waever, and several others (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010: 75). The 
theory provides the possibility of widening the concept of security. This is 
possible because Securitization Theory does not subscribe to the objectivist 
understanding of security that assumes the existence of “objective” or “real” 
threats outside their social construction. For several decades, the realist-
traditionalist understanding of security has dominated security studies. This view 
presupposes the state as the most important aspect of security and thus situates the 
military sector as the main response to security concerns (Sheehan 2005).  
In contrast, Securitization Theory – grounded in a constructivist paradigm 
– challenges the objectivist understanding of security by arguing that security is 
socially constructed. However, the Copenhagen School does not offer a subjective 
construction of security that lies upon personal perspectives of threats because this 
might result in a radical relativist way of understanding security. Instead, the 
Copenhagen School proposes a middle ground between objective-positivist and 
subjective-relativist. They highlight an “intersubjective process” of the 
construction of security (Buzan et al. 1998: 30). According to Hansen (2000: 
288), the “intersubjective” understanding paves the way to the widening of the 
security concept, but is also able to hinder “unlimited expansion” that could make 
the security concept become meaningless.   
	   17	  
Before further discussing the key concepts of Securitization Theory, I 
would like to highlight a crucial concept from the Copenhagen School that is 
central to this thesis, which is “the spectrum of public issues”. According to 
Buzan et al. (1998), public issues can be understood from a spectrum consisting of 
non-politicized, politicized, and securitized. The first point refers to an issue that 
is not debated publicly and therefore, the state has no involvement in the issue. 
When the issue is politicized, the state will have a role in it and the issue will 
receive public attention, which will then lead it to being debated. Securitized 
means that an issue is perceived as an existential threat to a particular object. 
Thus, an extraordinary response is employed (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24). The 
definition of a non-politicized issue is clear, but the line between a politicized 
issue and a securitized issue is unclear and still requires more explanation. Buzan 
et al. (1998: 29) highlight that the aim of politicization is to handle the issue 
transparently; “a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that 
therefore entails responsibility”. In contrast, securitization is marked by “the 
breaking of procedure or rules he or she would not otherwise be bound by” 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 25). Breaking the procedure in a politicized issue, in this case, 
is not treated as a free choice, but rather as a last resort, when it is necessary or 
unavoidable in order to handle a threatening issue.  
The spectrum of public issues can be a useful guidance for this thesis. This 
study needs to identify where on the spectrum the issue of transit forced migrants 
was located during the time of the Indochinese refugees’ arrivals and where on the 
spectrum the issue was during the time of the new influx of forced migrants. 
Understanding the location of the issue within the spectrum is important in order 
to be able to build up an argument that revolves around the representation of 
transit forced migrants changing from a non-security issue into a security problem 
(see Chapter 1).  
In regard to the process of how an issue becomes a security concern, Ole 
Waever (1995: 55) argues that “security is not of interest as a sign that refers to 
something more real: the utterance itself is the act”. His claim is based on 
understanding that security could be regarded as speech acts, where declaring 
something as a security issue is the act. It means that an issue or social groups can 
be securitized if actors enunciate to certain audiences that the intended issue poses 
an existential threat to one or more particular referent objects and that therefore, 
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in order to handle the issue, extraordinary measures need to be executed 
immediately (Waever 1995: 55; Buzan et al. 1998: 21).  
It is the dynamics of those components: actors, existential threats, referent 
objects, extraordinary measure, and audiences that are central to Securitization 
Theory. An existential threat generates a sense of urgency and therefore locates an 
issue on the top of the priority list that needs to be handled immediately, often by 
unusual measures. The securitization can only work if the object that is presented 
is being threatened or is considered as something fundamentally important (Buzan 
et al. 1998).  
However, ‘speech acts’ – the epistemology of Securitization Theory – has 
mainly become the object of critiques from other scholars working with the 
widening of the security concept. Balzacq (2005: 181) claims speech acts focus 
too much on the “internal” nature of threats, but negate “external threats” that 
have nothing to do with the discursive strategy of speech acts.  In contrast, he 
argues that language influences people´s perception of reality, but language does 
not construct it. In other words, language matters in the construction of meaning, 
but it is not the only thing that matters. His epistemological stance allegedly 
differs from the Copenhagen School, which Buzan et al. (1998: 204) claim as 
“radically constructivist”. Drawing upon the case of securitization of migration in 
Greece, Karyotis (2012) underlines a relatively similar problem on the inability of 
the ‘speech acts’ approach to illuminate the non-discursive process of the 
securitization of migration. As the consequence, he argues that speech acts fail “to 
capture the full dynamic of the complex process through which issues are raised 
on the security agenda” (Karyotis 2012: 392).  
Huysmans (2000) provides a suitable alternative understanding that can 
illuminate the “complex process” of the securitization of migration to this thesis’ 
case. Huysmans highlights that ‘speech acts’ can impose securitization, but it is 
not the only possible way. Securitization can also be imposed through “restrictive 
policy and policing” (Huysmans 2000: 751). The latter argument is developed to 
tackle the “weak” point of the discursive approach – that speech acts that only 
focus on political speeches in the public domain inevitably belittle the less visible, 
but still influential, works of “security experts”, such as the police (Huysmans 
2006: 8).  
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In that context, I find the concept of “security continuum” that Huysmans 
developed from Didier Bigo to be useful for this thesis. Security continuum is “an 
institutionalized mode of policymaking that allows for the transfer of the security 
connotations of terrorism, drug trafficking and money-laundering to the area of 
migration,” (Husymans 2000: 760, Huysmans 2006: 71). Huysmans further 
explains that the transfer of security concern to the migration issue will work in 
the way that it would change people’s perception on the initial meaning of 
migration issue or refugees´ issue.  
Hammerstad (2014: 268-269) also shares a similar idea to Huysmans by 
arguing that in many cases, refugees and asylum seekers are not directly referred 
to as “threats or enemies”, but “they were lumped together with other more 
traditional scary trends such as international crime”. In this thesis’ case, I include 
other types of crimes that, according to previous studies, are regularly connected 
to migrants, such as people smuggling, arms smuggling, human trafficking, global 
mafias, arms smuggling (Nyberg-Sorensen 2012; Curley 2008).  
In a nutshell, the theory is useful for guidance in two ways. First, almost 
all public issues can be securitized, thus the way the media represents refugees 
and asylum seekers can contribute to securitization or it can also be a tool to 
analyze whether an issue is securitized or is not securitized. Second, securitization 
can take the form of directly referring to migrants as existential threats (Buzan et 
al. 1998). It can also take the form of lumping the migration issue together with 
frightening crimes (Hammerstad 2014). Up to now, what is not yet outlined by 
this thesis is a tool to analyze the actors´ motivation for securitizing migration. 
The same tool can arguably be used to analyze why migration is not securitized.  
 
3.3. Actors’ Motivations   
The Copenhagen School argues that Securitization Theory has to deal with 
various questions of security, ranging from what are considered as threats, when 
an issue should be securitized, how it is securitized, who securitizes the issue, 
why an issue is securitized, and under what conditions an issue is securitized 
successfully (Waever 1995: 58; Buzan et al. 1998: 32). Even if the Copenhagen 
School is clear in providing the operationalization framework on the process of 
securitization, they are not clear enough to offer a tool to analyze why an issue is 
securitized.  
	   20	  
In understanding that not all problematic issues are securitized, Buzan et 
al. (1998: 32) argue that to securitize or not to securitize an issue is a matter of 
choice, “it is a politics”. Therefore, how then do we proceed to investigate the 
choice behind the decision to securitize transit forced migrants? Waever (1995) 
briefly touches upon the issue of why an issue is securitized when he illustrates 
the securitization of the environmental issue. He furthermore argues that the 
reason is obvious, which is the combination of “the possible magnitude of the 
threat posed” and “the need to mobilize urgent and unprecedented response” 
(Waever 1995: 63). However, assessing the magnitude of the problem to 
understand motivation to securitize an issue will not work within this study’s case. 
That is because the number of transit forced migrants in Indonesia was much 
higher during the time of Indochinese refugees’ arrival compared to the current 
condition, and while the issue was not securitized during the arrival of the 
Indochinese refugees, the new generation of forced migrants has been securitized 
(see Chapter 2 for the data).  
In order to answer the question on the reason behind the changes in the 
portrayal of forced migrants in Indonesia, this thesis borrows Georgios Karyotis’ 
(2012) framework to analyze the elites’ motives to securitize the migration issue. 
In "Securitization of Migration in Greece: Process, Motives, and Implications", 
Karyotis employs two layers of analysis: the subconscious drivers of elites and 
cost-benefit calculations (Karyotis 2012: 399). The subconscious drivers are 
deeply-rooted in the mind of the elites and condition their beliefs about who they 
are and what they roles are, and are thus not easily changed. It could be something 
that serves as “a core belief” (Karyotis 2012: 399). Cost-benefit calculations 
assume that the elites are rational actors that ground their choices in something 
with less cost that gives more benefits (Karyotis 2012: 340).  
However, for Karyotis’ framework to function well in the Indonesian 
context, it is necessary to take into account the regional influence. The importance 
of discussing regional influence is connected to the cost-benefit calculations 
motivation. In this layer of analysis, Karyotis puts too much emphasis on the 
domestic politics and neglects regional influences. Curley (2008: 20) argues that 
combining domestic politics and regional security dynamics could explain why 
“some cases of undocumented migration are securitized while similar cases are 
not”. The regional security dynamic could put pressure on elites’ decisions to 
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securitize or not to securitize, but it could also serve as a way to control 
challenges towards state legitimacy, as well as opening the opportunity of 
“resources sharing” (Emmers et al. 2008: 63).  
To conclude this section, the framework to analyze the motivation behind 
actors’ decision to securitize the migration issue will be a combination of the 
above-mentioned concepts. It will look into the subconscious drivers of actors as 
well as be accompanied by the calculations of cost and benefit that are based on 
the domestic condition and the regional security dynamic. Moreover, the same 
framework will also be used to analyze why the actors decide not to securitize 
forced migration issues.  
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4. Methodology  
 
4.1 A Pluralist Methodology 
This thesis understands that an issue can be constructed as a security threat, but it 
does not mean that external realities do not exist outside the process of the 
enunciation of an issue as a security threat. As such, this work accommodates the 
critical realist’s perspective. This thesis takes into account both observable 
variables and also non-observable variables that might contribute to the 
observable outcomes (Brante 2001). Accommodating critical realism’s 
perspective in this study also opens a possibility of combining both quantitative 
and qualitative methods through a pluralist methodology (Klintman 2014). In the 
context of Securitization Theory, Balzacq (2011: 52) also endorses a pluralist 
approach. According to him, scholars working with the Securitization Theory can 
use various methods such as discourse analysis, content analysis, process tracing, 
and ethnographic methods. It is also not unusual for those methods to be 
combined in some way.  
On that basis, this study employs two methods, namely media content 
analysis and thematic analysis. The reason for combining the methods is to 
maximize each method’s strength by compensating each other’s weaknesses. 
Media content analysis is beneficial to provide the patterns of forced migrants’ 
representations, but this method has a limitation in answering ‘why’ questions 
(Bryman 2012: 304). According to Bryman, by solely depending upon this 
method, researchers might be able to argue for some answers, but it will only be 
speculative. In this regard, he suggests that to answer a ‘why’ question – which is 
one of the focuses of this thesis – researchers need to conduct an “additional data 
exercise” that can also be qualitative analysis (Bryman 2012: 307).  
Moreover, a combination of methods is something that is not unusual in 
research. In reference to Sulaiman-Hill et al. (2011) in a longitudinal comparative 
research about media portrayal in Australia and New Zealand, mix methods are 
also utilized through content analysis and thematic analysis. The positive side of 
combining two different methods is to be able to provide suitable answers to 
various questions. In this study, content analysis is used to analyze media articles 
for comparisons in how the refugees and asylum seekers were portrayed in two 
different time spans. In addition, it is also used to analyze how securitization 
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happens and who securitized the issue. The thematic analysis serves to explain the 
actors´ motives to securitize or not to securitize transit forced migrants. In brief, 
the data analyses are conducted in two stages. The first stage is conducted through 
media content analysis, and the second stage is through theoretical thematic 
analysis.   
 
4.2. Pilot Study 
Before I designed my thesis research, I first conducted a pilot test with small 
samples. This pilot test was intended to see whether this study is worth being done 
in the first place. The samples were Kompas newspaper articles with the 
distribution of 54 articles representing the period of the Indochinese refugees’ 
arrivals, and 63 articles representing the period of the new generations of forced 
migrants. The samples were coded openly. This initial study gave some insight 
that served as an overall preliminary argument for this study. First, the label that 
dominated was initially ‘refugees’, and then that changed to ‘illegal immigrants’. 
Second, the frame of the news that initially contained a humanitarian approach 
and problem-solving issues became dominated by law enforcement. Third, the 
actors that made statements in the media also changed from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense/Military to the Indonesian National 
Police (INP) and the Directorate-General of Immigration (DGI).  
 
4.3. Media Content Analysis  
In brief, media content analysis is a “message-centered methodology” (Neuendorf 
2002: 9 cited in Macnamara 2005: 1) that is useful to analyze a broad range of 
texts from the contents of newspapers or newsmagazines to the content of films 
and television programs (Macnamara 2005: 1). Hansen et al. (1998: 95) argues 
that this method is “by definition a quantitative method” due to its emphasis in 
identifying and counting topics or communication symbols in texts under scrutiny.   
This method is chosen for this study because it is suitable to provide 
patterns of media portrayal over time about particular issues in large corpuses 
(Berelson 1952; Gunter 2000 cited in Levinsen and Wien 2011: 842). In this 
sense, content analysis is useful to establish patterns of the transit forced 
migrants’ representations in the Indonesian major print media over a period of 38 
years. In utilizing content analysis, this thesis subscribes to the procedure of 
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Hansen et al. (1998: 98-99); (1) formulating research questions, (2) choosing 
samples, (3) constructing categories, (4) developing coding schedule, (5) test the 
coding schedule in small scale and readjust it, and (6) conduct the full coding and 
thus analyze the data. All of the steps are performed in sequential order. The 
categories and the coding schedule are developed in parallel to one another by 
consulting to the pilot study, the literature review and also to the theoretical 
framework.  
This thesis does not intend to measure the usefulness of a text through 
quantitative means, but rather to seek the underlying message of the manuscripts. 
In other words, the analysis excludes the measurement of texts’ lengths, 
frequencies of the appearances of certain words, or direct or indirect sentences.  
Instead, this study only focuses on developing simple categories, such as basic 
information of the text concerning what labels are used to represent refugees, 
what are the main topics of discussion in the news concerning refugees, and who 
are the actors making statements in the news. Furthermore, for research purposes, 
each category is further divided into sub-categories. 
These categories and sub-categories are translated into a coding schedule 
that – more or less – serves as a simple questionnaire. In order to avoid mistakes 
during the coding process, a codebook that serves as a coding manual is also 
created as an aid. According to Bryman (2012: 299), a coding manual is “a 
statement of instruction to code that also includes all of the possible categories for 
each dimension being coded”. In other words, the coding manual should be 
detailed, as it is important to guarantee the reliability of the study. In this study, 
inter-coder reliability is not an issue because the coding process is only conducted 
by one person. However, it is important to make sure the code book is clear 
enough to ensure that one coder can code different texts in a consistent way.   
In this study, firstly the codebook is developed in line with the literature, 
as well as from the pilot study. In total, the codebook only consists of eight pages, 
consisting of detailed explanations of categories and sub-categories. For example, 
the categories for labels are ‘illegal immigrants’, ‘illegal asylum seekers’, 
‘refugees’, and ‘asylum seekers’, while for the themes; the categories are ‘non-
security’ that incorporates both ‘non-politicized’ and ‘politicized’, and ‘security’. 
Thus for each theme, there are also sub-themes. In the ‘security’ theme, lies the 
sub-themes ‘traditional physical threats’, ‘economic threats’, and ‘societal threats’ 
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(for details see Appendix 1). When the codebook and coding schedule were ready, 
a trial test was conducted with a few texts. The results from this test allowed me 
to reformulate the approach if needed, and to also add some new sub-categories to 
the codebook. The full coding has been conducted manually and analyzed using 
Microsoft Excel. 
 
4.4. Theoretical Thematic Analysis  
As previously mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, thematic analysis is 
employed to provide answers to a ‘why’ question – which the media content 
analysis method is unable to do. In the context of this study, the ‘why’ question is: 
why did the representation of transit forced migrants in the Indonesian print media 
change? Since this question is answered by utilizing Securitization Theory, the 
‘why’ question is then reformulated into: why were the transit forced migrants 
securitized/not securitized? 
Thematic analysis is commonly misunderstood with similar methods. 
Bryman (2012: 578) argues, “it is not an identifiable approach”. He thus gives an 
example of a “framework approach” as a strategy to conduct thematic analysis, by 
providing a matrix of a framework consisting of themes and sub-themes. 
However, Bryman´s argument is in contrast to Smith and Firth (2011) that argue a 
framework approach differs from thematic analysis, even if both methods have 
something in common, such as, identifying themes. They argue that a framework 
approach is different in a sense that this approach is more “complex” and 
“transparent” than thematic analysis (Smith and Firth 2011: 54-55).  
Braun and Clarke (2006) provide a clearer definition and a ‘know-how’ 
explanation about thematic analysis. They highlight thematic analysis as being 
epistemologically and theoretically “neutral”, which allows it to be 
operationalized either inductively or deductively. For this study, I decided to do a 
deductive “theoretical thematic analysis” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 84). This 
means that the themes shall be driven by previous research or theories. This 
approach might reduce the richness of the data, but it will instead give an 
opportunity to provide “detailed analysis of some aspect of the data” (Braun and 
Clarke 2006: 84).  
In regards to this thesis, it is important to bear in mind that for the 
thematic analysis the materials are not only media reports from Kompas 
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newspaper, Tempo magazine, and Tempo newspaper. It also incorporates 
government reports from Indonesia and other related countries (USA and 
Australia), on national law and government regulations. The time spans of the 
additional materials are the same as for the media report samples. I generate two 
grand themes – based upon consultation to previous research – which are 
subconscious drivers and cost-benefit calculations. Thus, the samples are read and 
then coded carefully. Afterward, I organize the codes into two bigger groups in 
connection with my theoretical grand themes. In order to generate sub-themes 
under the two grand themes, the scattered codes are thus rearranged. In each of 
sub-theme, I also provide excerpts of texts that serve as evidence, as well as to 
strengthen arguments in each sub-theme (Braun and Clarke 2006: 93).   
 
4.5. Sample Design  
The news samples were taken from three prominent and influential media houses 
in Indonesia. Two of them are newspapers, namely Kompas and Tempo, while the 
other one is a newsmagazine named Tempo. Newspapers and magazines are still 
the most popular in terms of its circulation in print media. In 2013, newspapers’ 
circulation reached 9.5 million while magazines were sold for 7.8 million copies 
per edition. In total, within the same year, the circulation of print media in 
Indonesia was about 22.3 million copies (Serikat Perusahaan Pers, 2014: 54-55). 
The market penetration of print media in Indonesia was about 25 percent of the 
population (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika 2013).  
There are three reasons as to why these three print media sources were 
chosen. First, two out of the three media sources were established before the 
arrivals of Indochinese refugees in 1975. Kompas newspaper was founded in 
1965 while Tempo Magazine was established in 1971. Tempo newspaper was 
established in 2001, but since it is under similar editorial management, it can be 
argued that the reports of Tempo magazine during Indochinese refugees´ arrivals 
could be a source of comparison to the news articles of Tempo newspaper. This 
enables this thesis to access continuous reports about refugees from different time 
spans. This continuity is vital because this study focuses on the patterns of forced 
migrants’ representations over a long time period. The reason of not adding other 
media houses will be discussed under the ‘limitations’ section of this chapter.   
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Second, these three media sources are also the highest ranked among 
Indonesian media in regards to their circulation. In 2010, Serikat Perusahaan Pers 
(The Union of Press Companies) recorded that Kompas newspaper’s circulation 
was an average of about 600,000 copies per edition – putting Kompas forward as 
the most circulated newspaper in Indonesia. Tempo newspaper was in third 
position with 200,000 copies, while Tempo news magazine’s circulation was 
120,000 copies per edition (Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika 2013). 
Additionally, those media also have an expansive national distribution, as well as 
nation-wide news coverage.  
Third, these media houses have high reputations for their quality in 
Indonesia. Kompas is a leading reputable newspaper in Indonesia with a strong 
value of “to console the poor, to remind the established” (Manzella 2000: 315), 
while Tempo magazine, in Janet Steele’s (2003: 127) words, is acknowledged as 
the most important weekly news magazine in Indonesia, which provides “a 
picture of events that is highly influential”.  
When the selection of media sources and time periods were completed, the 
next step was to select news samples in accordance to “relevant content” (Hansen 
et al. 1998: 104). The samples were chosen through relevant sampling design, 
through the use of certain keywords. Internal search engines from Kompas and 
Tempo were used since Indonesia does not have an integrated media archive. 
Searching for articles on Vietnamese refugees, the keyword combination used 
were those of pengungsi (refugees), Vietnam, imigran gelap (illegal immigrants), 
Indocina (Indochinese). For the recent waves of refugees, the keywords were 
imigran gelap (illegal immigrants), transit, Indonesia, pengungsi (refugees), suaka 
(asylum).  
The sample selection includes straight news, feature stories, editorials, 
interviews, and opinion columns. The results of the data selection through 
relevant keywords reached 256 entries for the time span of Indochinese refugees 
and 298 entries for the time span of after the Indochinese refugees´ arrival. In 
order to find samples that serve the purpose of this research, all of those articles 
were read and reselected. In the case of the articles that only mentioned Indonesia, 
but no Indonesian sources were mentioned, the items were abandoned. In total, 
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there were 216 relevant samples3 that were coded for this study, with distributions 
of 129 articles from Kompas newspaper, 37 articles from Tempo magazine, and 
50 articles from Tempo newspaper. In regards to the articles distribution based 
upon the time span, 123 articles were published in time span of new waves of 
forced migrants (1997-2013), while 93 articles were published during the 
Indochinese forced migrants’ arrival (1975-1996). In regards to the sample 
distribution per year, please see Graph 1.  
 
Graph 1 
Sample Distribution 
 
 
The content media analysis that is conducted in the first stage is also 
helpful in selecting relevant news articles for the theoretical thematic analysis. 
Only articles that contain statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Military are reused in order to find the answer for the reason behind non-security 
approach in the handling of the Indochinese refugees’ arrivals. In addition, only 
news articles containing comments from the DGI and INP are reused for the 
thematic analysis in finding an answer to the reason behind decision to securitize 
the migrants. All of the samples of this thesis were written in Indonesian. 
Therefore, the news extracts that I provide in the upcoming chapters are my own 
translation4. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Other studies that used media content analysis had various numbers of samples, 
ranging from 203 articles (Nolan et al. 2011) to 1,174 articles (Levinsen and Wien 
2011).	  4	  My native language is Indonesian. I did not find any difficulties to understand 
the news samples of this study.	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4.6. Limitations 
As a case study of representations of refugees and asylum seekers in media and 
government documents in Indonesia, this thesis has a limitation in the 
generalization of the results of the study. However, this thesis compensates the 
limitation with a possibility to present a more nuanced investigation by analyzing 
the changes in two different time settings. The samples of this study were only 
limited to 216 news articles from three print media. The problem was due to the 
bad archival system in the majority of print media houses in Indonesia. Only two 
media houses are well known for having a proper archive management, which are 
the Kompas and Tempo groups. An effort to add one more media house, Media 
Indonesia has not been a success because of an incomplete archival system. Media 
Indonesia only has access to news reports published from the end of 1996 and 
above, even though the newspaper was established back in 1970 
(www.mediaindonesia.com/aboutus).  
Another potential pitfall is the exclusion of online media that have played 
a significant role in the Indonesian media industry. It is also evident that more 
articles about transit forced migrants have been published in online news portals. 
However, this study did not include this platform because it contained no news 
about Indochinese refugees. However, it might be beneficial to include this news 
platform for future research about the representation of refugees in recent time.  
Moreover, thematic analysis of texts still has a limitation in investigating 
the motive behind the actors’ decision in securitizing transit forced migrants. 
Interviews might be a good choice for digging up information about the motives 
to securitize the new generations of forced migrants, however, they might not be 
suitable for collecting data about the motives for not securitizing the Indochinese 
refugees.  
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5. Changing Representations: A Sign of Securitization? 
 
This chapter contains the results of a content analysis of 216 news reports about 
refugees and asylum seekers who have transited through Indonesia during two 
different time periods: the Indochinese refugees´ arrivals (1975-1996) and post-
Indochinese refugees´ arrivals (1997-2013). The results show that the way that 
transit forced immigrants were labeled and were discussed evidently changed 
between the periods. In addition, the dominant actors who made statements within 
the media also changed. This chapter thus also discusses the meaning of the 
changes.  
 
5.1. Changing Labels 
The content analysis of the labels was conducted at the level of the entire article. 
Each article was only coded once. During the period of arrival of the Indochinese 
refugees, the vast majority of the sample used positive labels. The label of 
‘refugees’ appeared in 72 percent of the news samples. In total, the combination 
of positive representations such as ‘refugees’, ‘mix-positive’ and ‘boat people’ 
reached 89 percent. Mix-positive contains a combination of two or more of the 
positively connoted labels, such as ‘refugees’, ‘boat people’, 5  and ‘asylum 
seekers’. The use of negative terms, such as ‘illegal immigrants’ was very low. 
There was no single article that solely used ‘illegal immigrants’ to represent the 
migrants. Instead ‘illegal immigrants’ was always used together with a positive 
label like ‘refugees’ (for detail see Table 3).  
In contrast, the uses of labels were dramatically different in the second 
time span; negative labels dominated the major print media´s representation of the 
transit forced migrants. The ‘illegal immigrants’ label appeared in 60 percent of 
all news samples, while the combination of positive labels – ‘refugees’, ‘asylum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5In this study, I categorized “boat people” as a positive label. I was aware that it 
might be problematic to categorize “boat people” as a positive label since in 
developed countries, it has negative connotation. However, for Indonesians, “boat 
people” shows the plight of the forced migrants that had to leave their country on 
an unsafe vessel and with limited resources. Therefore, it evoked local people’s 
sympathy. 	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seekers’, and ‘mix positive’ – appeared only in 5 percent of the samples (see 
Table 3). 
 
Table 3 
Representations of Transit Forced Migrants in Indonesian Print Media 
Labels Indochinese 
(1975-1996) 
Post-Indochinese 
(1997-2013) 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Refugees 67 72 2 2 
Mix positive 14 15 3 2 
Mix positive-negative 8 9 40 33 
Fugitive 2 2 0 0 
Boat people 2 2 0 0 
Illegal Immigrants 0 0 74 60 
Immigrants 0 0 2 2 
Mix negative 0 0 1 1 
Asylum seekers 0 0 1 1 
Total 93 100 123 100 
    N = 216 
 
 
5.2. Changing Themes  
The content analysis also scrutinizes the way transit forced migrants were 
discussed in the media reports. In this study, the unit of analysis was at the level 
of an actor´s statement. Each actor´s statement in a report was only coded once. In 
total, there were 209 statements coded from 93 articles in the period of 
Indochinese refugees, and 278 statements coded from 123 articles in the second 
period. The number of statements is proportional to the number of actors making 
the statement.  
Table 4 shows that the themes of the statements in the two time spans 
were very different. In the period of Indochinese refugees, the non-security theme 
was dominant, contributing to 89 percent from 209 statements. This theme 
incorporates discussion on the plight of refugees, living conditions, and solutions. 
In contrast, in the time span of the new generation of forced migrants, the security 
issue dominated the statements, with the frequency of 64 percent from 278 
statements. The non-security theme dropped to 15 percent.   
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Table 4 
Themes of Transit Forced Migrants Discussion 
Themes Indochinese 
 
Post-Indochinese  
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Non-Security 186 89 41 15 
Security 22 11 179 64 
Non-conclusive 1 0 58 21 
Grand Total 209 100 278 100 
 
 
5.3. Changing Actors  
Regarding the actors who made the statements, the Indonesian government 
officials appeared most frequently within both time spans. In the period of the 
Indochinese refugees’ arrivals, the government officials’ statements contributed to 
48.3 percent from 209 statements. Various international actors appeared at 28.7 
percent. The category of ‘refugees’ statements’ was in the third place with 11 
percent (see Table 5). The domination of the government officials increased 
significantly in the second time span. In the period of the new waves of forced 
migrants, the Indonesian government officials contributed to 70 percent from the 
overall statements (see Table 6). In this time span, the presence of international 
actors reduced to third place, with the forced migrants’ voices increased to the 
second place.  
 Although the statements by the Indonesian government were dominant in 
both time spans, there were some shifts of sub-categories within the Indonesian 
government category. In the time of Indochinese refugees’ arrival, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense/military were the two most dominant 
institutions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributed to 20.6 percent of the 
overall statements, while the Ministry of Defense contributed to 13.6 percent. 
These compositions changed dramatically in the second time span. Those two 
institutions dropped to third and fourth place respectively in the time of the new 
waves of forced migrants. Their roles were replaced by DGI and INP instead. The 
DGI voices in the media reached 27.3 percent, while the INP contributed to 26.3 
percent from the overall 278 statements. 
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Table 5 
Actors in the Period of 
Indochinese Refugees Influx 
Actors Total (%) 
Indonesian government 101 48.3 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  43 20.6 
Ministry of Defense/Military 29 13.9 
Local governments 6 2.9 
Police 4 1.9 
President 3 1.4 
Member of parliament 8 3.8 
Ministry of Information 3 1.4 
Other government officials 1 0.5 
Immigration 2 1.0 
Ministry of Social Affairs 1 0.5 
Port authority 1 0.5 
Refugees  23 11.0 
Local people 15 7.2 
International actors 60 28.7 
UNHCR 15 7.2 
Vietnam 11 5.3 
Australia 10 4.8 
The USA 8 3.8 
Others 7 3.3 
ASEAN (collective) 2 1.0 
Malaysia 6 2.9 
IOM 1 0.5 
Media 8 3.8 
Others 2 1.0 
Total 209 100.0 
 
 In addition, changes in the compositions also occurred within the 
international actors´ category. During the Indochinese refugees’ arrival, UNHCR, 
Vietnam, Australia, and the USA gave active voices regarding the care of 
Indochinese refugees. In the period of the new waves of forced migrants, the 
USA’s voices disappeared. In contrast, Australia’s voices became dominant. The 
strong presence of Australia will be discussed in Chapter 7, regarding the 
motivation behind securitizing moves made by DGI and the INP. In addition, the 
presence of the USA’s voice will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
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Table 6 
Actors the Period of post-Indochinese Refugees 
Actors Total (%) 
Indonesian government 195 70.1 
Immigration 76 27.3 
Police 73 26.3 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  17 6.1 
Ministry of Defense/Military 17 6.1 
Local government 4 1.4 
Members of parliament 2 0.7 
Others government officials 2 0.7 
Port Authority 2 0.7 
President 1 0.4 
Ministry of Social Affairs 1 0.4 
Refugees 33 11.9 
International actors 25 9.0 
Australia 11 4.0 
UNHCR 7 2.5 
IOM 5 1.8 
Others international actors 2 0.7 
Local people 7 2.5 
Media 7 2.5 
Academician/experts 6 2.2 
Others 4 1.4 
Smugglers 1 0.4 
Total 278 100.0 
 
5.4. From a Politicized Issue to a Securitized Issue 
Employing media content analysis, this study has shown different representations 
of the transit forced migrants in Indonesia within two different time spans. They 
were labeled differently and the themes of the discussions also changed. Those 
changes led to one major question: why were the Indochinese refugees portrayed 
with positive labels and were discussed in non-security theme, while the newer 
generations of forced migrants were represented with negative labels and thus 
framed as security threats? The theoretical framework chapter has provided tools 
for answering the question. Borrowing Buzan et al.’s (1998) spectrum of public 
issues, this thesis can argue that the different representations were because of the 
issues being situated at different points of the spectrum.  
During the Indochinese refugees’ arrival, transit forced migrants allegedly 
was situated in the zone of a politicized issue. In contrast, the issue of the new 
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generation of forced migrants was in the process of moving from the politicized 
zone to the securitized zone. This section will further establish empirical evidence 
to support these arguments. The issue of the Indochinese refugees was discussed 
widely in the print media, and thus, the government regulated the migrants (Buzan 
et al. 1998). In 1979, the Indonesian government established a refugee processing 
camp in Galang Island. Within the same year, the Indonesian President Suharto 
issued a Presidential Decree Number 38/1979 on the Coordination for Solving the 
Vietnamese Refugees Problem in Indonesia (Keputusan Presiden RI 38/1979). 
The decree becomes the only presidential decree to regulate international refugees 
transiting in Indonesia (Taylor and Rafferty-Brown 2010: 144).  
The content analysis in the previous sections has shown that in the period 
of the Indochinese forced migrants, almost 90 percent of the samples show the use 
of positive labels towards the migrants. In addition, about 89 percent of 209 
statements made by the actors in the samples of news articles can be grouped into 
the category of non-security issues. It means that even though the issue was 
debated in the public sphere, the migrants were not securitized. Graph 2 shows in 
detail that almost 60 percent out of 186 statements with the non-security theme in 
the period of Indochinese forced migrants’ arrivals discussed refugees in 
connection to an effort to solve the problem. This theme includes the 
establishment of a refugee processing camp, their resettlement, repatriation, and 
international cooperation in handling refugees. The second most common theme 
was the humanity theme incorporating the living condition of the forced migrants, 
the refugees´ plight while in the journey to Indonesia, the refugees´ basic needs, 
and their waiting time in Indonesia. The opportunistic behavior of refugees6 was 
in third place.  
The newer generations of forced migrants that came from Middle Eastern 
countries and South Asian countries were labeled mainly with negative terms, 
such as ‘illegal immigrants’. Labeling transit forced migrants as ‘illegal migrants’ 
cannot be separated from states’ efforts to govern migration as it is not only a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This theme of opportunistic behavior was not categorized under ‘security issues’ 
because it was mainly statements from the Vietnamese authority saying that the 
refugees fled their country due to their failure to adapt with the communism’ style 
of life. It was not considered a threat for Indonesians who also refused the 
communist ideology. 	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matter of categorizations (Scheel and Squire 2014) – it represents an underlying 
way of the states’ thinking that inevitably contributes to why the refugees and 
asylum seekers are handled through tougher measures. Furthermore, the previous 
section shows that 64 percent of 278 statements in the period of post-Indochinese 
refugees’ arrivals discussed refugees along with security concerns. 
       Graph 2 
Details in Non-security issue, 
Indochinese Refugees’ Arrivals 
 
In arguing that these changes serve as signs that the issue has been 
securitized, it is necessary to answer the following questions (Buzan et al. 1998; 
Waever 1995): What existential threats were associated with the transit forced 
migrants? Who were the actors? What extraordinary measures were offered to 
handle the threats? In regards to threats and extraordinary measures this study, as 
mentioned in the theoretical chapter, also takes into account the argument that 
forced migrants do not need to be directly referred to as threats, but it can also 
take form of putting them together with traditional or transnational crimes 
(Huysmans 2000: Hammerstad 2014).  
 Graph 3 provides empirical evidence for the argument above. About 57 
percent out of 179 statements – categorized as security theme – discussed the 
migrants along with a transnational crime theme. The crimes include people 
smuggling, human trafficking, and drugs trafficking. The second security issue 
associated with forced migrants was the illegal status of their presence in 
Indonesia. About 25.7 percent of the statements contributed to this discussion. In 
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total, those two threats contribute to 148 out of 179 statements. In general, the 
transnational crimes and the illegal statuses of migrants can be categorized under 
traditional physical threats (Innes 2010).  
Graph 3 
Threats Associated to Transit Forced Migrants 
 
However, the societal and economic threats that appeared quite frequently 
in developed countries’ settings (Innes 2010) evidently did not appear in the 
Indonesian case. It can be due to the fact that Indonesia is a very diverse nation 
consisting of hundreds of ethnicities, languages, and cultures. All of those 
ethnicities were united by the political ideology of Pancasila7 – the five principles 
– that also contains the idea of multiculturalism. In a sense, there is no 
homogenous identity of ‘being Indonesian’ that might be harmed by the presence 
of these forced migrants in transit. Furthermore, the economic threat also did not 
appear significantly because of two reasons. First, the forced migrants’ basic 
needs are handled by international organizations such as IOM and UNHCR – not 
by the Indonesian government. Second, while waiting in Indonesia, the refugees 
and asylum seekers are not allowed to work, which means they pose no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Pancasila is the Indonesian national ideology consisting of five principles, 
respectively: (1) belief in one God, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) Indonesian 
unity, (4) democracy under the wise guidance of representative consultations (5) 
social justice for all the peoples of Indonesia.  I borrowed a translation of the five 
principles from Encyclopedia Britannica 
http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/440932/Pancasila  
Transnational	  crimes,	  57.00%	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competition to the local job market (Peraturan Direktur Jenderal Imigrasi IMI-
1489.UM.08.05). 
Regarding the actors who made the securitizing move, Huysmans (2000: 
758) argues that in the European Union context, the securitization of migration 
includes “multiple actors such as national governments, grass roots, European 
transnational police network, and the media”. I, too, agree that securitization is a 
complex process. Therefore, it might be problematic to refer the actors of the 
securitization of migration to particular persons or institutions. However, the 
empirical materials of this study provide evidence that INP and DGI8 were the 
two dominant securitizing actors, making the most frequent statements in the 
media (see Table 6). Moreover, Table 7 shows those two actors were mainly 
giving statements concerning the illegality of transit forced migrants’ statuses and 
other statements that linked transit forced migrants with transnational crimes. In 
total, those two institutions contributed to 104 statements of the overall 148 
statements referring to transnational crimes and illegal statuses of the migrants.  
Table 7 
Actors and the Security Framing of Transit Forced Migrants 
Actors Total Percentage 
Police 58 55.8% 
Transnational crimes          48          46.2% 
Illegality status          10            9.6% 
Immigration 46 44.2% 
Transnational crimes          19          18.3% 
Illegality status          27          26.0% 
Total 104 100.0% 
  
Police and Immigration officials gain legitimacy in securitizing the issue 
due to their nature of being “specialized agencies” (Watson 2009) or “security 
professional” (Huysmans 2000). According to Watson, their main audiences – 
who need to be convinced on the nature of the threats and the solutions that need 
to be taken – are “the governing elites” (Watson 2009: 20). In that sense, their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8INP and DGI consist of various individual actors from national, provincial, and 
district levels. The reason for lumping them together as actors at the institutional 
level was due to the chain of command nature of those two institutions. It is 
unlikely for police officials to show dissenting opinion about transit forced 
migrants against their institutional policy.  
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statements in the media shall be understood as not to get public approval of the 
securitizing move, but rather, they will be seen as part of “symbolic measures” 
(Bigo 1998: 158) in order to establish an image that they have done something to 
handle the refugees´ issue, while meaning that they have not necessarily solved 
the problem. In other words, the aim was to gain “moral support” from the public, 
while they achieved “formal support” from elites (Balzacq 2005: 184).  
Graph 4 
Solutions Offered to Handle the Migrants’ Threats 
 
The arguments are thus also connected to the extraordinary measures they 
offered. In Graph 4, from 179 statements on threats associated with transit forced 
migrants, the vast majority came without concrete solutions. In addition, 22.9 
percent suggested severe law enforcement as a solution to the threats. This 
includes investigation on the smuggling cases and also the idea to increase 
punishment for people who were involved in the smuggling process. The idea of 
severe punishment has been implemented after the Indonesian government issued 
a revision of the Immigration Law in 2011. People who are involved in the 
smuggling process, whether ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’ can be convicted to 5 to 15 years 
jail time (Undang-Undang Nomor 6 tahun 2011, Article 120). The law brings 
huge consequences for refugees and asylum seekers in transit in Indonesia. With 
the new regulation, any kind of assistance connected to an alleged people 
smuggling network can lead to imprisonment.  
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6. Why Were the Indochinese Forced Migrants Not 
Securitized?  
 
This chapter discusses the internal and external factors that contribute to the 
actors´ motivation not to securitize transit forced migrants at the time of 
Indochinese refugees´ arrivals. The actors – as revealed by the media content 
analysis – are the Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Ministry of Defense/the 
military. Grounded in the theoretical framework, the investigation is conducted in 
two sub-chapters, namely the subconscious drivers and cost-benefit calculations.  
  
6.1. Subconscious Drivers   
It was more or less a decade after the failed coup – for which the Indonesian 
Communist Party was blamed – when the first group of Indochinese refugees 
came to Indonesia in 1975. As a consequence of the failed coup the first President 
of Indonesia, Sukarno, was forced to resign, and was subsequently replaced by 
Suharto, a military general. Suharto’s new regime constructed hatred towards 
communism portraying communists as ‘evil’. In the early years of the New Order 
regime, about half a million people were killed (Elson 2001: 125) – mainly those 
who were associated with the Indonesian Communist Party.  
When the brutal reaction towards communism had become internalized in 
the minds of the Indonesian people, it arguably served as subconscious driver for 
the Indonesian elites to not securitize the forced migrants, who were seen as 
‘poor’ beings fleeing their country due to the cruel communist 
government.  Therefore, it was a noble action to take care of them. News reports 
in the mid of 1979 – the time when inflows of refugees soared – mainly blamed 
the Vietnamese government. Some of the articles containing the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs regularly put pressure on the Vietnamese government to also take 
some responsibility in handling the refugees´ issue.   
In an official report about the care and security arrangements in Galang 
Island Refugees’ Processing Center, the writer of the report, Lieutenant Colonel 
(Police) Kunarto, mentions Vietnamese officials had a policy of “throwing waste” 
(Kunarto 1980: 10). The description of analogizing refugees with ‘waste’ was 
evidently used to construct a bad image of the Vietnamese government as not 
willing to take care of their citizens. In contrast, the refugees were portrayed 
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differently. Still in the same report, Kunarto (1980: 110) describes refugees as 
follow:    
 
“Refugees are like ‘stripped’ persons, even if they were rich 
or highly educated […] Mostly they had experiences of 
being extorted and threatened by the Vietnamese rulers. 
They were robbed, raped, and threatened by pirates. Their 
ships were directed back to the sea. With their own eyes, 
they witnessed the pledge of their friends and families who 
drowned in the sea.”  
  
     Another indication was the use of Pancasila – the five principles – as a 
foundation of justifying the government’s policy to take care the refugees. A 
government source in Kompas (19/10/1978) argued that the refugees´ arrivals had 
caused problems for Indonesians. However, they had to be accepted due to 
humanitarian value, which is included in Pancasila. He mentioned the decision to 
be a “consequence of Pancasila”. In another news extract, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mochtar Kusumaatmadja said, “So what should we do? Should we let 
them die or drown in the sea? Where is our Pancasila then?” (Tempo magazine 
21/04/1979).   
     Karyotis (2012) argues that subconscious drivers in policy-making might 
be based on certain values. In the Indonesian context, Pancasila served as these 
values. Nevertheless, the hatred of communism that led to sympathy toward the 
Indochinese refugees should not be understood as the sole driver of the actors to 
keep the issue of transit refugees away from the realm of being securitized. The 
next section provides other perspectives to understand the complexity of the issue 
of transit forced migrants in the Indonesian setting.     
  
6.2. Cost-Benefit Calculations   
The thematic analysis has generated three important themes within cost-benefit 
calculations. First, the Indonesian government´s non-security approach in 
handling Indochinese refugees was intended to neutralize the negative portrayals 
of Indonesia deriving from the Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. 
Additionally, the non-security approach fitted the regional and global 
‘atmospheres’ that made it able to attract resources.  Lastly, it was also aimed at 
maintaining state legitimacy by showing that the government was controlling the 
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inflows and outflows of forced migrants. It also showed the government’s active 
role on the regional and global level.      
         It is also important to bear in mind that initially, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Indonesian military had contesting perspectives on the handling of 
refugees. The idea to establish a refugee processing center at Galang Island came 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, possibly from the Minister himself, Mochtar 
Kusumaatmaja (Pane 2015: 351). The Ministry of Defense initially opposed the 
idea. Tempo magazine (22/09/1979) in “Doors in Pejambon” quotes a source 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mentioning that “it is not a secret that there 
was ‘misunderstanding’ between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and another 
ministry in regards to the issue of handling the refugees”. Tempo did not openly 
mention the name of the ministry, but it was apparently referring to the Ministry 
of Defense. Before President Suharto made the final decision to issue a 
presidential decree on the handling of refugees, there were statements from the 
military officials that tried to contest to the idea of establishing a refugee 
processing center. It can be found in these extracts:     
“Regional Army Commander Brigadier General Sularso 
worries that the establishment of refugees processing center 
will trigger the increase of refugees´ arrivals” (Kompas 
12/06/1979).   
  
Additionally, the Minister of Defense General M Jusuf argued:   
 “The arrivals of refugees have created many problems that 
can trigger local people restlessness. The increasing of 
goods´ prices, refugees’ brawl…” (Tempo magazine, 
17/03/1979).   
  
Suharto appointed the Ministry of Defense as the coordinating ministry in 
handling the refugees´ issue through the Presidential Decree Number 38/1979, in 
a bid to show his effort to calm the military. It was necessary because Suharto 
used the military to secure his power. He had been in full control of the Army 
since 1969 (Elson 2001: 182). The Presidential Decree consolidated all of the 
refugees’ security and care arrangement into the hands of the Ministry of Defense. 
In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for diplomacy and 
cooperation with international organizations (Keputusan Presiden RI 38/1979).     
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6.2.1. Good Public Relations  
Under the New Order regime, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had an interest in 
developing an image of Indonesia as a country that respected human rights. By 
providing a refugee processing center and taking active role in solving the 
refugees’ issues in Southeast Asia region, the Indonesian government could 
legitimize the claim. The news materials confirm this argument. The vast majority 
of the Indonesian government officials, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
highlighted the humanitarian aspect of the Indochinese refugees´ issue.    
Arguably, it had something to do with the Indonesian government’s 
military intervention in East Timor in 1976: ever since the invasion, Indonesia had 
been seen by the international community as an abuser of human rights. Under the 
atmosphere of the Cold War, Western countries, including the USA, did not 
oppose Suharto´s decision to integrate East Timor as part of Indonesia. The US 
government though asked Suharto to conduct a public relations campaign so that 
the US did not face opposition back home for their support of Indonesia.   
On 10th May 1978, US Vice President Walter Mondale met Suharto in 
Jakarta. A declassified document consisting of a summary of the meeting, 
includes a statement where Mondale says that the Carter administration “does not 
question the incorporation of East Timor to Indonesia […] There are problems on 
how to deal with our mutual concern regarding East Timor and how to handle 
public relations aspect of the problem” (United States Departement of State 1978: 
36-37). The focus of the discussion within the meeting was a US suggestion that 
the Indonesian government open East Timor to some visitations from non-
governmental organizations in order to show that East Timor was not a closed 
zone.   
Less than a year after the meeting, the Indonesian government decided to 
offer an island as a refugee processing center. The policy was considered ‘soft’ 
compared to Indonesia’s neighboring countries – such as Singapore, which 
rejected the Indochinese refugees. In 1979, when the refugees´ arrivals increased 
significantly, Thailand and Malaysia also refused refugees, and thus sent boats 
carrying refugees back to the sea. The Indonesian government’s decision to 
reduce the number of new refugees through tougher border control was in 
response to the actions of Malaysia and Thailand (Osborne 1980). The Malaysian 
Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed in June 1979 said, “refugees in 
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Malaysia would be expelled, and those seeking to enter in the future would be 
shot if they ignored warning to go away” (Osborne 1980: 50).   
         The Foreign Affairs Ministry, the military, and Suharto did not openly 
provide any link between helping refugees and the military action in East Timor. 
However, the way the Indonesian elites repeatedly highlighted Indonesia´s 
humanistic approach in helping Indochinese refugees evidently provided the red 
thread. Even when the military made a firm statement on refusing entry to new 
refugees, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs neutralized it by arguing that Indonesia 
still employed a humanistic approach. One of the extracts shows an anonymous 
Indonesian official mentioning that, “offering an island can elevate Indonesia’s 
position because it was a humanitarian offer” (Tempo magazine 31/03/1979).   
Suharto in his speech at the People’s Consultative Assembly on the 16th 
August 1979 also highlighted the same point. He mentioned that the Indonesian 
government would not offer permanent resettlement because Indonesia could not 
afford to do so. The government still needed to increase the well-being of the 
Indonesian citizens. However, he kept underlining the humanistic approach in 
tackling refugees, as follow:    
 
“We truthfully had lent our hand to help tens of thousands of 
refugees consisting of the elder, men and women, 
youngsters, children, and even infants. For the sake of 
helping human being and in the name of humanity we truly 
had done what we could do according to our ability” 
(Sekretariat Negara RI 1979: 340).    
   
In his speech, Suharto used ‘refugees’ to represent the forced migrants – 
not a single time employing the ‘illegal immigrants’ label. He also linked the 
issue with a humanitarian problem and how to solve it. There was no mention 
about people smuggling or transnational crimes. The way he perpetrates the 
‘truthfulness’ of the Indonesian government policy in helping refugees in the 
name of humanity can also be understood as a way to convince the public that the 
motivation to help refugees was pure; there was no ulterior motive. However, was 
that true?  Alexander Betts (2006: 38) argues that the Galang Island Refugee 
Camp was politically exploited by the Suharto regime. Suharto used the camp as 
an example of how Indonesia respects human rights, which evidently gained 
international media´s attention.  
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A retired military officer who was involved in the Galang Refugee Camp, 
Admiral Kunto Wibisono made a similar observation. In a semi-biographical book 
about Galang Island Refugee Camp, he argues that Suharto personally made four 
directives in regard to the Galang Island Refugees Camp. The last point was that 
the refugees should be treated humanely in accordance with the second principle 
of Pancasila – just and civilized humanity. It was assumed that the last point of 
the directive was intended to neutralize the negative opinion towards Indonesia 
originating from the East Timor problem (Ismayawati 2013: 10-11). 
 
6.2.2. Attracting Resources   
The empirical materials suggest that attracting resources from the international 
community was one of the motivations to not securitizing the Indochinese 
refugees. Attracting financial support was very salient in the Indonesian 
government’s narrative. The other kinds of resources were to increase the third 
countries’ resettlements quota and to endorse neighboring countries not to 
conduct unilateral refoulement. The increase of resettlement quota from 
developed countries was crucial in order to make sure that all of the refugees 
would leave Indonesia as soon as possible. In addition, hindering unilateral 
refoulement policy from the neighbor countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand 
served as a preventive measure to avoid massive arrivals of refugees who were 
expelled by those countries.   
    Intention to attract financial support can be found in the way the 
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the international community to 
provide joint funding towards establishing a refugee processing center on Galang 
Island. Not only for the development of the camp, but also for the operational 
costs. In the news report, the Indonesian officials proposed 18.5 million USD for 
the initial establishment of the refugee processing center in 1979. The 
representative of 24 countries – including the USA, Japan, and Australia – 
accepted the proposal (Tempo magazine 20/05/1979; Kompas newspaper 
16/05/1979). Besides the direct financial needs of caring for refugees, the 
financial support was also channeled into the development of areas surrounding 
the refugee processing camp. The circulation of money in the area also triggered 
the local economy. In addition, the military was most likely benefiting from the 
presence of the processing center as well. For example, the Indonesian Navy’s 
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business unit became the supplier of the refugees’ food (Tempo magazine 
01/03/1980).   
It was clear that if the government decided to securitize the forced 
migrants, only harm would be done. On one hand, they might not able to gain 
financial support from those members of the international community that were 
willing to help the refugees. On the other hand, the Indonesian government would 
not be able to refuse all of the refugees since they would continuously come forth. 
One of the Indonesian officials mentioned, “If they were treated like ordinary 
immigrants, they would fully become the responsibility of Indonesian 
Immigration” (Tempo magazine 31/03/1979). To deter the refugees according to 
the same narrative as Malaysia – to be shot if they would not obey warning – 
would only diminish Indonesia’s reputation even further within the international 
community, considering the blowback from the East Timor problem. To let it 
become ‘business as usual’ would show the incompetence of the Indonesian 
government in handling the issue, thereby delegitimizing the government.    
The materials also suggest that Indonesia´s soft approach to the 
Indochinese refugees was also intended to force the developed countries to accept 
more refugees through resettlement programs. Not only to increase the quota, but 
also to make the resettlement process faster. It can be seen from these extracts: 
“One of the preconditions of the provision of the Island was that the Western 
countries agreed to accept these fugitives. So, there will be no residual problem 
for ASEAN” (Tempo magazine 24/02/1979). In addition; “[…] urge developed 
countries to continue their effort in making the refugee issue as international 
responsibility” (Kompas 09/08/1983). In that logic, the more – and the quicker 
the third countries accepted refugees, fewer refugees would stay in Indonesia. 
Yet, it did not work that way since the quicker resettlement process through the 
Galang Island’s Refugee Processing Center attracted more Indochinese refugees 
to come to Indonesia.  
  
6.2.3. Maintaining Legitimacy   
Not securitizing the forced migrants can also be linked to the motivation of 
maintaining legitimacy. First, by not securitizing the forced migrants, the 
government was able to attract resources providing the possibility for the 
government to establish a refugee camp that minimized contact between the 
	   47	  
forced migrants and the local community. The camp was helpful in the way that it 
gave the government full control of the forced migrants´ movement because they 
were concentrated on one island. The refugees were allowed to visit the main 
island temporarily, but they still had to return to camp eventually. 
The need to monitor the forced migrants was mainly because the vast 
majority of the refugees were Chinese descendants. During that time, Indonesia 
had an issue with tens of thousands of Chinese descendants who were labeled as 
‘illegal immigrants’. They were suspected to be loyal to China instead of 
Indonesia. That was considered as security issue because the military believed 
that the Chinese government supported the failed coup in 1965. Soon after, 
Suharto solidified his hold on power and Indonesia suspended diplomatic ties with 
China in October 1967 (Suryadinata 1990: 684) – which lasted until 1990.    
In addition, showing the public that the government employed a friendly 
approach by letting the refugees to come to Galang Island meant that the 
Indonesian government was in full control of the refugees’ arrivals. In other 
words, the massive arrival of refugees was not a reflection of a failed attempt of 
the Indonesian military in containing the issue, but on the contrary, this showed 
that they were effectively handling the issue. This logic of reasoning can be found 
in the way the Indonesian government highlighted that the issue of refugees´ 
arrivals was not easy to be handle, but it was still under the government control. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs argued, “since the Bangkok meeting, the number 
of refugees is still increasing. However, do we panic? Shall we fight each other? 
Do we run? No! […] No other people can guard our home better than ourselves” 
(Tempo magazine 07/07/1979).  
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7. Why Were the New Generations of Forced Migrants 
Securitized?  
 
This chapter discusses factors that led the actors´ decision to securitize the transit 
forced migrant issue within the period of the post-Indochinese refugees’ arrivals. 
The actors in this time span are specialized agencies, namely the INP and DGI. 
Corresponding to the theoretical framework, discussion in this chapter consists of 
two sections, which are subconscious drivers and cost-benefit calculations.  
 
7.1. Subconscious Drivers  
During the Indochinese refugees´ arrival, the issue of communism could have 
arguably served as a subconscious motivation that influenced the actors´ decision 
to not securitize the refugees. Considering the fact that the Cold War has since 
ended, this was not the case in the context of the new generations of refugees. 
Even after the fall of Suharto’s regime in 1998, the public’s hatred of communism 
had reduced although it did not entirely disappear. The subconscious driver that 
led actors to securitize the new generations of forced migrants was not so salient. 
One possible explanation is to dig into the elites’ understanding of nationalism.  
That is nicely illustrated by a lead paragraph of a feature story about 
forced migrants in Tempo magazine (04/11/2001) that was written as follows: 
“the rains of stones in other people’s countries, the rains of illegal immigrants in 
our country. What else could we say? That is a fate that Indonesia should accept 
in the midst of the unfinished crisis.” The first sentence of the lead paragraph was 
a modified version of a well-known Indonesian proverb meaning, “the rains of 
gold in other people countries, the rains of stones in our country. Still, it is better 
to stay in our country”.  
The proverb has an implicit message of nationalism that one should stay 
and be loyal to their homeland, even at the time when the country is in trouble and 
neighboring countries seemingly offer better wealth. In this sense, besides 
describing Indonesia as suffering the consequences from conflicts in other 
countries, the paragraph also criticizes forced migrants who have shown 
‘disloyalty’ to their home countries by leaving it during times of hardship to 
pursue ‘the rains of gold’ or wealth in other countries. Thus, it also connects to the 
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general perception of the honesty of the forced migrants’ claims. In recent years, 
the asylum seekers globally are more seen as driven by economic reason.   
 
7.2. Cost-Benefit Calculations  
Thematic analysis of news reports have shown two factors that motivated the two 
institutions to securitize transit forced migrants. This part will argue that the 
external motivations of the INP and DGI were to attract resources and maintain 
the institution’s legitimacy.  
 
7.2.1. Attracting Resources  
The motivation to securitize the transit forced migrants in order to attract 
resources remains somewhat latent in the news report samples. Neither the 
statements made by officials from the INP nor the DGI in the media directly 
asked for a budget increase in order to tackle the ‘threat’ of transit forced 
migrants. Instead, both institutions show relatively similar narrations through the 
dichotomy between the complexity of the problem and the lack of resources to 
handle it. However, the message is obvious: in order to tackle the complicated 
problem, the problem of a lack of resources should first be solved.  
The thematic analysis also shows that the narratives from the two 
institutions were not identical since they each showed different stressing points. 
When representing the complexity of the problem, DGI officials tend to focus on 
issues – such as how forced migrants could be very demanding in the matter of 
their basic needs or in regards to how they want a faster process in finding 
permanent resettlement. The issue of how forced migrants escape from detention 
centers has appeared many times to be the most problematic for the immigration 
officials.  
In contrast, INP underlined the sophistication of people smuggling 
networks that assist forced migrants going to Australia from the Indonesian 
coastal border. Their narratives were centered on issues surrounding the 
smuggling networks that involve international actors, local people, several state 
apparatuses, namely police officers and soldiers. The highly organized 
recruitment process was also discussed, showing the disconnected chains of the 
recruitment, the transportation of smuggled forced migrants, the changing routes 
and modes of operation, and finally the high financial and equipment supports. 
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However, both the INP and DGI officials have something in common: they argue 
that the geographical condition of Indonesia provides so many ‘ratlines’ ready to 
be used by the smuggling networks. 
The motivation of the Immigration officials to attract resources is evident 
in their statements that centered on three points, which are the lack of detention 
centers both in terms of quantity and quality, the lack of funding for taking care of 
forced migrants, and finally, the lack of personnel. Most commonly, the 
statements on the lack of detention centers appeared within the Kompas 
newspaper, Tempo newspaper, and Tempo magazine, such as “detention center 
should only accommodate 80 people, but now there are 129 people here. We even 
had accommodated 200 people,” (Tempo magazine, 05/09/2010) or “immigration 
has 13 detention centers, which according to the Director of Immigration 
Investigation and Prosecution R Muchdor, some of them are too small to function, 
do not have sufficient means, and the capacities to housing people are below 
needs” (Kompas, 30/04/2010).  
The lack of detention centers forces immigration officials to use the 
immigration office’s hall and police station’s jail for accommodating migrants. In 
some cases, this problem is blamed as the cause of migrants escaping. In regards 
to funding, the immigration officials refer to the basic needs of migrants as well as 
additional incentives for officials to work overtime. Meanwhile, in the context of 
limited personnel, it connects to two functions. First, the lack of manpower to 
guard the migrants, which is highlighted in this extract: “the Immigration 
Detention Center in Kupang only has eight guards that are divided into two 
groups. They are mainly only contracted workers while the migrants are reckless 
people” (Tempo magazine 05/09/2010). Besides, the lack of personnel also 
connects to the inability to control the inflows and outflows of migrants at the 
Indonesian borders as described in the following extract: “Indonesia has 129 
immigration checking points and 79 border crossing posts with only 5,327 
immigration officers conducting services in Indonesia and abroad” (Kompas 
30/04/2010).  
Those limited capacities of the Indonesian DGI give reason to attract 
resources from outside the country. Australia is evidently one of the most 
generous parties that support the DGI. However, unlike financial and equipment 
aid for the INP that is given directly, Australia pours the money into the IOM, 
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which afterwards, assists the Indonesian Immigration. The strategy for avoiding 
public unhappiness with the immigration function closely connects to the 
sovereignty of a state, in particular, through how it regulates who is allowed and 
who is not allowed to enter or leave the country (Hollifield 2000: 141). 
Indonesians could perceive direct financial assistances to the Indonesian 
Immigration as a form of Australian intervention to their country’s sovereignty. In 
several extracts, the immigration officials mention the IOM repeatedly, referring 
to the organization as helping in the financing and caring of transit forced 
migrants.  
The supports were based on a tripartite agreement between IOM, the 
Indonesian government, and the Australian government in 2001 (Mcnevin 2014: 
644). Every year, the IOM provides a special budget for the transit forced 
migrants in Indonesia under the program of “care and voluntary return of migrants 
in an irregular situation in Indonesia” (see Table 5). An explanation of the 
program in IOM’s budget says that the organization is supporting the financial 
needs of the Indonesian government in caring for the forced migrants – from their 
basic needs to the transportation cost of the migrants. Additionally, the funding is 
also used for the purpose of “strengthening regional cooperation and providing 
technical support to Indonesia’s migration management systems….” (IOM 2006: 
81). Table 8 shows that the immigration was able to attract significant resources.  
 
Table 8 
IOM Annual Budgets 
“Care and Voluntary Return of Migrants in an Irregular Situation in 
Indonesia” 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
USD 
(millions) 
1.206 2.729 3.709 2.966 2.459 2.119 2.981 3.103 
Source: IOM (2001-2008) 
 
The INP meanwhile, used a different narrative to gain financial supports. 
Unlike the immigration that highlighted the lack of resources, the INP allegedly 
showed the advance systems and mode of operation of people smuggling in order 
to attract resources. This narrative mainly describes their effort in arresting 
migrants and in halting smuggling networks, thus arguing that the smugglers’ 
ways of working are very organized in both the inter-provincial and international 
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arena. Therefore, it is only logical that the way to handle this is by improving the 
equipment and capabilities of the INP.  
Within the aspect of domestic funding, the securitization of transit forced 
migrants is considered an ‘emergency’, and thus, should be a ‘priority’ above any 
other issue (Buzan et al. 1998). The sense of priority will pave the way to get 
more resources. According to data from the Indonesian House of Representatives, 
in between 2005-2010 INP’s budget was increased by 138 percent, from 11.6 
trillion IDR to 27.6 trillion IDR  (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat RI 2010: 1). The 
report also mentioned that one of the outcomes of the budget increases for INP 
was an increase in solving conventional and transnational crime cases, rising from 
76,000 cases in 2005 to 79,000 cases in 2010 (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat RI 
2010: 1).  
In regards to resources from outside the country, the Australian Federal 
Police  (AFP) is one of the active supporters of INP. The INP spokesperson 
Inspector General Didi Widayadi in Tempo newspaper (05/09/2001), admit that 
five regional police forces regularly received money from AFP, which could be 
seen as follows;  
“Only 125 million IDR for five regional police […] the 
cooperation is directly between Australian Federal Police 
and Indonesian National Police, not between the two 
governments. The regional police that quarterly receive 
funding are Metro Jaya (Jakarta), West Java, Bali, East 
Nusa Tenggara and West Nusa Tenggara. In assumption 
asylum seekers regularly transit in those regions.”  
  
In a report, AFP also admits the funding is given to five INP special 
intelligence units that are charged with gathering intelligence information towards 
“the arrest and prosecution of Indonesian-based people smugglers and their 
networks” (AFP 2002: 11). Other assistances from AFP to INP can be read in 
AFP Annual Reports 2002-2003, mentioning that AFP granted five small boats 
worth 1.5 million AUD to the INP (AFP 2003). Some regional police also 
received equipment supports directly from AFP. Bali Regional Police received 
computers, motorcycles, camera recorders, and GPS from AFP. On the media, the 
representative of AFP says, “Bali has been a transit point for illegal immigrants 
planning to go to Australia. We hope that equipment will be beneficial for Bali 
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Regional Police, specifically in handling the case of people smuggling” (Kompas, 
06/11/2010).  
The motivation of attracting resources as one of the drivers of the 
Indonesian elites to securitize transit forced migrants might be problematic. Some 
scholars might argue that Indonesia’s specialized agencies can still attract 
resources without securitizing transit migrants. Mainly, it is connected to the 
belief that the Australian government needs help from Indonesian officials in 
making sure that the transit forced migrants stay in Indonesia rather than escape to 
Australia. However, it is important to bear in mind that the specialized agencies 
focus on protecting Indonesia’s public support, since the Australian aid could 
easily being framed as a form of intervention to national sovereignty. The 
calculations of resources and legitimacy will be further discussed in the chapter of 
connecting the dots. 
 
7.2.2. Maintaining Legitimacy  
Securitizing transit forced migrants as a way to maintain legitimacy works in two 
ways. First, through performative actions; it shows that the state apparatuses, the 
INP, and also the DGI, have tackled the issues. Those two institutions regularly 
report to the public – through mass media – on how they tried to handle the issue 
of the ‘uninvited guests’. Second, the way the INP and DGI label the transit 
forced migrants as ‘illegal immigrants’ could arguably become a strategy to show 
the public that the government has done something to handle the inflows of transit 
forced migrants, but the migrants always try to find way out to tackle the 
government efforts. It is mainly due to the way those institutions link forced 
migrants to people smuggling networks.  
     Indonesian immigration officials and the INP officers work together when 
doing raids in areas with a high concentration of transit forced migrants – mostly 
in open detention centers provided by the IOM and other international 
organizations. Transit forced migrants that are unable to show attestation letters 
from UNHCR or get an attestation letter from a UNHCR office outside Indonesia 
were sent to immigration detention centers. In the case that the nearest detention 
center is full, some migrants are then transferred to police stations.  
     The raid is intended to show the Indonesian public that the DGI has done 
what it can in order to stop the ‘illegal’ people from entering Indonesian borders. 
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The threats, according to the DGI officials can be very negative to Indonesia in 
the long run, which is illustrated from this extract: “immigration officials presume 
a new mode of operation in human trafficking. Indonesia has become transit 
country, but can also become target country” (Kompas newspaper, 10/06/2006).  
In contrast, the INP continuously constructs public trust of their legitimacy 
by repeatedly guaranteeing that they can establish public order and prevent 
‘unauthorized’ movement of forced migrants in and out of Indonesia through non-
regular channels. The rhetoric took form in quantity and quality statements. In 
regards to quantity as an example, INP’s Chief Detective Commissaries-General 
Sutarman says, “in 2009, INP holds in custody 996 illegal immigrants, in 2010 
about 2,352 immigrants, in 2011 it reached 2,470 immigrants” (Kompas 
10/02/2012).   
The INP also continuously publicizes the quality of their work, for 
example, when they tackled a people smuggling network even when it was an 
international syndicate. It is clear in this extract, “The Head of West Java 
Regional Police Inspector-General Suhardi Alius says, his officers is hunting an 
Indian citizen who is suspected to be the mastermind behind people smuggling. 
Boat carrying immigrants sink in South Cianjur Coastal, West Java” (Tempo 
newspaper, 30/06/2013).  
The performative nature of the raid and custody of the transit forced 
migrants somehow did not solve the problem. After the security approach used by 
the aforementioned state apparatuses, the results did not show a positive 
correlation with the decrease of transit forced migrants coming to Indonesia. In 
several cases, the migrants tried once more to leave Indonesia for Australia 
through non-regular channels such as use the smugglers services. The following 
extracts show it;  
“Those migrants were arrested when the bus they used 
passed by Singosari Street. They afterward were brought to 
the Malang City Police Station. However, for the sake of 
immigration document investigation, the migrants were 
handed over to Malang Immigration officials. The 
interrogation revealed that among those illegal immigrants, 
four people once run away from Bangil Immigration 
Detention Center” (Tempo newspaper, 12/07/2012).  
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     Even though the raid and the arrest of the people smugglers did not 
contribute to the decrease of the inflows of undocumented transit migrants in 
Indonesia, it was still useful in maintaining public trust within specialized 
agencies, as well as the government’s legitimacy. Karyotis (2012) argues, in order 
to secure their legitimacy the government needs to show to their constituents that 
they have the willingness to control the situation. Sometimes it can take the form 
of “symbolic reassurances” (Edelman 1964: 153 cited in Karyotis 2012: 401). The 
symbolic reassurances by the INP and also DGI are likely reactive when some 
incidents happen. When the media reported that many people died in the 
Indonesian sea due to the sinking of the boat carrying smuggled refugees to 
Australia, both the DGI and the Police conducted raids.  
     It is important to bear in mind that the people smugglers work in a 
clandestine manner; when their works are successful, no one knows. However, 
when they fail – for example, in the case of the Australian Navy intercepting the 
ship carrying forced migrants thus creating diplomatic tension with Indonesia – 
the Indonesian public will know. A ‘parade’ of small or medium size successes in 
tackling people smuggling that are propagated in the media, can neutralize the 
negative critiques of the inability of the state apparatuses to instill public order. 
This is more so in a case where a lot of people have been affected, and then INP 
has the responsibility to bring the perpetrator to the court.  
     Additionally, labeling transit forced migrants as ‘illegal immigrants’, 
insinuating that they are involved in people smuggling, could to some extent, 
excuse the Indonesian state apparatuses from their failure. This is because 
‘refugees’ or ‘asylum seekers’ fall under understanding of being passive, whereas 
being a ‘refugee’ means that the person fled their country under a situation which 
is not within his or her control. In other words, a person that is labeled as 
‘refugee’ is closely connected to a condition of “restricted agency” (Scheel and 
Squire 2014: 188). On the other hand, an illegal immigrant shows a more active 
agency. Being an ‘illegal immigrant’ means that a person firstly conducted 
something illegitimate, which means that the person associated with the term 
‘illegal immigrant’ performed “less-restrictive agency” than forced migrants as 
such refugees (Scheel and Squire 2014).  
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8. Connecting the Dots 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 have provided explanations of motivations for and against 
securitizing transit forced migrants. Within the discussion of cost-benefit 
calculations, the themes of maintaining legitimacy and attracting resources have 
emerged. However, arguing that these two themes explain the motivations for 
both securitizing and not securitizing transit forced migrants in two time spans 
might be perceived problematic – this is, in particular, related to the theme of 
attracting resources. One might argue that there was a possibility that the 
specialized agencies could receive funding from Australia even if they did not 
securitize transit forced migrants. Therefore, this chapter will highlight three 
arguments to tackle this issue that were implicitly mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7.  
Firstly, if the issue was not securitized, the public would question the 
necessity of those agencies to receive financial support from Australia. In an 
‘emergency’ situation where the specialized agencies argue that transit forced 
migrants pose a threat to Indonesia while there is simultaneously a shortage of 
resources to deal with this situation, the ‘extraordinary’ step of receiving aid from 
Australia will be strongly justifiable and legitimate. Otherwise, implementing a 
soft policy and receiving resources from Australia might construct an image of 
those institutions as being a lackey of the Australian government, thus 
delegitimize them.  
Secondly, in general, the Indonesian government cannot afford to show a 
friendlier approach as during the Indochinese refugees’ arrivals. That is due to the 
possibly protracted nature of the transit forced migrants in the current reality of 
global reluctance in accepting forced migrants. According to Crisp (2003: 78), 
after the end of Cold War the developed countries have become less interested in 
financing assistance to forced migrants, while the developing countries that once 
generously accepted those migrants feel “their generosity was too easily and 
quickly forgotten by the international community”.  
Handling the Indochinese refugees has been acknowledged as an 
undesirable experience for Indonesian government officials. It was due to the 
protracted condition of the Galang Island Refugee Processing Center. The camp 
was only designed to last for about 3-5 years from the time it was first established 
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in 1979. However, the facts show that the inflow of Indochinese forced migrants 
did not stop until the 1990s, even after the stricter process of giving refugees 
statuses began at the end of the 1980s. On one hand, Indonesia faced continuous 
inflows of refugees, but on the other hand, the number of resettlements offered by 
the developed countries had steadily decreased since the end of 1980s. According 
to the data from UNHCR, during 2001-2011, there were only 1,916 refugees who 
resettled in third countries or in average, about 190 people per year (Kompas, 
15/05/2012). The figures were almost nothing compared to the resettlement given 
to Indochinese refugees. During 1975-1996, there were 111,876 refugees who 
transited in Indonesia and resettled in third countries – which means about 5,327 
refugees were resettled per year (Ismayawati 2013: 190).  
Moreover, it was not easy to repatriate the forced migrants that were not 
accepted by the third countries. These experiences evidently made the Indonesian 
government think twice when deciding what to do with the newly coming transit 
forced migrants. A friendly policy and reception towards forced migrants might 
be sending a message to other forced migrants to come to Indonesia while waiting 
for their refugee statuses to be processed. The negative portrayal of the refugee 
processing center was reflected in a statement made by the Indonesian Director-
General of Immigration Iman Santoso suggesting that the Indonesian government 
needed to show a stronger stance in order not to let the ‘illegal immigrants’ stay 
for a lengthy time in Indonesia. The consequence of the protracted presence of 
forced migrants might lead to the emergence of “the Second Galang Island”, 
which the DGI officer emphasized should be hindered (Tempo magazine 04/11/ 
2001).  
Thirdly, the public resentment to the migrants is higher compared to the 
sentiment towards Indochinese refugees, in which the media might arguably play 
role in it. It is also evident that the general reception of refugees and asylum 
seekers from local societies has also changed compared to the time of the 
Indochinese refugees. From analysis of the news reports, the local communities’ 
comments were relatively positive. They mainly perceived forced migrants as 
poor people that needed to be helped. The majority of news during this time span 
that quoted local people discussed the emergency help they conducted. Comments 
from local people about forced migrants after the early of 2000s were mainly 
negative. Crisp (2003) highlights that the resentment might be due to the forced 
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migrants received facilities: free food, healthcare – while the local people do not 
enjoy the same facilities.  
During the Indochinese refugees’ arrivals, the refugees were concentrated 
on one island and therefore contact with other local people was limited. 
Additionally, under the Suharto regime, the government could easily control the 
media’s portrayal of forced migrants in order to maintain a positive public 
perception of forced migrants. The military evidently conducted surveillance 
toward mainstream media’s report on refugees and the refugees’ processing camp. 
Police Lieutenant Colonel Kunarto in his report as Security Commander of 
Galang Refugees’ Processing Center, had a special section in describing his 
evaluation toward the ‘framing’ and the ‘tone’ of national print media, and 
compared this with international media. Kompas newspaper and Tempo magazine 
were also on the monitoring list. Kunarto mentioned that national media had the 
tendency of reporting forced migrants negatively unlike the international media, 
which praised the Indonesian government (Kunarto 1980: 138).  
The same control over media reports could also be found in an internal 
classified radiogram from the Deputy Commander of ABRI (Indonesian Military) 
18th July 1979, which underlined that all activities regarding the processing of 
refugees and hindering new entrances of refugees were not allowed to be 
published for any publication. Besides, only the highest rank generals were 
allowed to give statements regarding those issues. Lastly, any visitation to the 
refugees processing center was only possible if one had a permit issued by the 
Ministry of Defense and Security in Jakarta (Radiogram Menteri Pertahanan 
T/545/1979). However, this is something that is not going to happen this time 
around. 	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9. Conclusion 
 
Drawing upon the Indonesian case, the thesis shows how the representations of 
transit forced migrants at the time of Indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 were 
remarkably different compared to the new generations of refugees from Middle 
Eastern and South Asian countries that came to Indonesia in 1997-2013. The 
former were portrayed with positive labels and discussed with a non-security 
approach, whereas the latter, by contrast were framed as a security threat. I 
showed the different portrayals of forced migrants by employing media content 
analysis on 216 articles from Indonesian major print media.  
I thus situated the different media portrayals within the spectrum of the 
public issue from the Copenhagen School. This thesis established the argument 
that the Indochinese refugees were situated as a politicized issue, but it was not 
securitized. Therefore, the portrayals of refugees in that time were still positive. 
Even if they were referred as a humanitarian burden, they were not framed as 
threats. In contrast, the new generations of forced migrants were shown as being 
lumped together with transnational crimes. They were also often labeled as 
‘illegal immigrants’. In this sense, I argued that the issue had been securitized.  
Based on the media content analysis I found out that the dominant actors 
during the different time spans were also different. During the Indochinese 
refugees’ arrival, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military were the actors 
that served to keep the issue of migration in the realm of the politicized. In the 
second time span the specialized agencies of the INP and the DGI were arguably 
the dominant actors who thus securitized the migrants.  
     This study took one further step by questioning: why were the Indochinese 
refugees not securitized? Additionally, why were the new generations of forced 
migrants securitized? I thus conducted the second step of the analysis by 
employing a theoretical thematic analysis on the selected materials to seek 
subconscious and conscious drivers that could explain the actors’ decisions within 
the two-time spans. The materials suggested that the decision not to securitize the 
Indochinese forced migrants was to provide a good portrayal of Indonesia in the 
international community after the Indonesian military invasion of East Timor in 
1976. In addition, it was also to attract resources and maintain legitimacy, which 
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was possible because it corresponded to the global perception of the forced 
migrants. The subconscious driver was allegedly due to the hatred of communism 
and the refugees were seen as the victims of the communist regime in Vietnam.  
     The next generations of forced migrants had no connection to communist 
regimes. Thus, it corresponded not only to the global perception of the new forced 
migrants, but also to the nationalistic understanding of the Indonesian elites. In 
addition, the experiences of handling the Indochinese refugees contributed to the 
understanding that following a ‘soft’ approach might cost too much while 
securitizing the migrants could instead attract more resources. Again, this was in 
line with global or regional perceptions on the issue of forced migration. 
Additionally, it can also serve to maintain legitimacy by showing to the public 
that the government conducted harsh policies to deal with the forced migrants.  
     Even though this thesis has tried to answer not only ‘how’ the issue was 
portrayed differently and thus answer ‘why’ it was portrayed differently, further 
research is still necessary. The study was not able to dig deeper on the 
implications of moving the issue from the realm of a politicized issue into the 
realm of a securitized issue. Did it actually solve the problem – or was the 
securitization of forced migration only a ‘symbolic’ gesture? Only through further 
research can we gain more knowledge by answering this question. 
In addition, this thesis only divided the period of over 30 years into two-
time spans simplifying the complex nature of media representations. However, in 
each time span there were also different dynamics, which cannot simply be 
explained through the spectrum of the public issue. For example, in general the 
label that was used in the period of 1975-1996 was consistent, with almost no 
mention of ‘illegal immigrants’. However, in the 1990’s the way it was discussed 
was a little different, with more emphasis on repatriation efforts. Lastly, this thesis 
conveys the problem through a macro perspective, but it might also be interesting 
to see a micro study about this issue by investigating how local media in a city 
with many transit forced migrants represents the refugees and how it influences 
the perceptions of local people on the refugees, and vice versa. 	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APPENDIX 1 
CONTENT ANALYSIS’ CODING MANUAL 
PRINT MEDIA’S REPRESENTATIONS OF TRANSIT FORCED 
MIGRANTS IN INDONESIA 
 
This codebook was generated with consultation to pilot study, literature review, 
and the theoretical framework sections. Some categories were generated from the 
result of reading the texts from both periods of time.  
 
Q1 Source 
1. Kompas newspaper 
2. Tempo magazine 
3. Tempo newspaper 
 
Q2 Date 
 
YYYY/MM/DD 
 
Q3 Title 
It is necessary to for the cross checking of codes.  
 
Q4 what type of story is it? 
 
1. Straight News  
It consists a news report that consists of 5W (what, when, where, who, 
why) of an event being reported. Interview materials usually dominated 
this type of article. Often, the lead paragraph contains a time line, referring 
to the ‘where’ aspect of the news.  
 
2. Feature stories  
This article is longer than news stories, with more in-depth information on 
particular issue being reported. It can be in the form of human-interest 
stories or feature analysis. The way the story is delivered is sometimes not 
direct as direct straight news that only deliver hard facts.  
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3. Editorial  
It is usually a reflection the media’s point of view in a particular issue. 
Written without the author’s name, thus it can be claimed as non-news 
reporting.   
 
4. Opinion  
An article about certain issues, consisting opinions from people not 
affiliated to the media house. It clearly expresses a standpoint of the 
author, which is usually public figures, academicians, political leaders, and 
experts.  
 
5. Column 
It is written by a special journalist or editor of the print media. It is written 
in an analytical way, thus also offering a personal view in particular 
issues.  
   
6. Interview 
It contains questions and answers with a particular source.  
  
7. Others 
 
For Q5 please bear in mind that the unit of analysis is the corpus of the text. 
It means each article can only be coded once.  
 
Q5 What labels are used to portray refugees? 
(This could be varied from one time attribution to more dominant attribution)  
 
1. Refugees (pengungsi) 
2. Illegal immigrants (imigran gelap, imigran ilegal) 
3. Asylum seekers (pencari suaka) 
4. Fugitive (pelarian) 
5. Illegal refugees  
6. Boat people (manusia perahu) 
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7. Immigrants (imigran) 
8. Mix positive (combination of refugees, asylum seekers, boat people) 
9. Mix negative (illegal immigrants, fugitive) 
10. Mix both positive and negative (contains both positive and negative labels, 
and also illegal refugees).  
 
For Q6, Q7, the coding is conducted in the level of statements. In that sense, 
firstly investigate the actors in the articles. Code only one main theme of the 
statements!!  
 
Q6 Who is the actor that made the statement?  
Please only code two digits. No need to code details until the lowest unit.  
 
1. Government  
1.1. President  
1.2. Foreign Affair Ministry  
1.2.1. Minister  
1.2.2. Director 
1.2.3. Source in the ministry  
1.2.4. Director general 
1.3. Military  
1.3.1. Minister of Defense  
1.3.2. Army officers 
1.3.3. Navy officers 
1.3.4. Galang Island Camp Committees 
1.4. Police  
1.4.1. National Police Officials (ranging from Chief of police, Special 
unit chief, every police officer that serve at national level) 
1.4.2. Local Police (ranging from provincial level to municipal level) 
1.5. Immigration  
1.5.1 Minister  
1.5.2. National level immigration official  
1.5.3. Provincial level immigration official 
1.5.4. Local level immigration official 
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1.6. Ministry of Social Affairs 
1.7. Ministry of Information 
1.8. Port Authority  
1.9. Minister of Health  
1.10. Advisor to Minister  
1.11. Local government (municipal and provincial) 
1.12. Member of parliament (national level and local level) 
1.13. Other government officials 
 
2. Refugees 
(Both asylum seekers and refugees, or those who are referred as illegal 
immigrants in some newspaper even though they already have a 
recognition paper from UNHCR) 
 
3. Local people (ordinary people in the news, usually appear without any 
attributions and age is given instead as a substitution)  
 
4. International actors (news source non-Indonesian)  
4.1. US (President, Special envoy, ambassador) 
4.2. Australia (PM, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Immigration, 
Ambassador)  
4.3. Malaysia (PM, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Immigration, 
Ambassador) 
4.4. Vietnam (PM, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Immigration, 
Ambassador)  
4.5. UNHCR (commissioner, regional representative, consultants) 
4.6. IOM (worldwide, regional representative, consultants) 
4.7. ASEAN (when the source refers the statement in the name of 
ASEAN) 
4.8. Others  
 
5.  Media  
5.1. Media voice (a report without any source in it as well as the editorial 
of the media)  
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5.2. Journalist special report (with the name of journalist)  
 
6. Academicians (experts/practitioners)  
 
7. Smugglers (actor that in the media mentioned as perpetrators, or 
smugglers).  
 
8. Others (actors that is not mentioned in any of above categories).  
 
 
Q7: In which themes, can the statements of actors be categorized? 
These categories emerged from Buzan et al.`s  (1998) spectrum of public 
issues, while the subcategories emerged from literature reviews and theories 
as well as pilot study.   
 
1. Non-Security  
This theme contains non-politicized and politicized issue. It means the 
discussion ranging from no debates, debates with the presence of the 
government in regulating the migrants.  
1.1. Humanity (news with this topic mainly discuss human interest stories, 
about the plight of refugees on their way to Indonesia, their waiting 
time in Indonesia, their daily life, their basic needs, education, living 
condition, and living expense. It also includes the relations between 
the local people and the refugees, but not in the context of bad 
behavior. Bad behavior shall be coded within social problems, not 
here.   
1.2. Solution oriented (This topic includes various themes mainly 
concerning how the issue of transit forced migrants should be tackled, 
or how to deal with refugees, or how to treat them. It includes 
keywords such as repatriation, resettlement, processing center, 
multilateral approach. (However, security oriented solution shall 
not be categorize in this part) 
1.3. Opportunistic nature of migrants 
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This part contains statements when migrants are mentioned by the 
Vietnamese government as having opportunistic behaviors – they do 
not want to work hard in accordance to the communist life style.  
1.4. Others  
 
2. Security 
In this issue, migrants are discussed as direct threats to security or connected 
to security issues. This category contains the issue of social problems, 
criminality, and border-control.  
2.1. Border control  
It contains issues of border patrol, refusing refugees, genuine versus 
non-genuine refugees, policing, and also direct associations with 
military threats.    
2.2. Social economic problem  
It connects migrants with prostitution, brawl, bad habit of refugees, as 
well as economic threats in the context of funding – though the need 
to support the basic needs of the migrants.  
2.3. Transnational crime  
Directly mentions people smuggling, criminal networks, transnational 
criminal groups, human trafficking, drugs smuggling. It can also be in 
the form of raids and arrests of refugees on the way to Australia from 
Indonesia.  In the case that the statement can be both coded with 
transnational crime and the illegality status of the migrants, code it 
with transnational crime.   
2.4. Breaking immigration law  
Fraud documents, no-visa, undocumented, actions stemming from the 
immigration law, detention centers (as consequences of breaking 
immigration law). It can also include the refusal to provide protection 
for the refugees or when refugees run away from the detention 
centers.  
2.5. Terrorism  
Direct or indirect connection to terrorism. 
2.6. Significant number 
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When it highlights the high number of refugees or when the volume of 
the refugees is mentioned to have increased significantly  
2.7. Sinking boat  
The statement talks about the ship carrying refugees that sunk in the 
sea. 
3. Non-conclusive   
When the statement only provides data or chronology. In addition, when in 
doubt about the statement, code as non-conclusive.  
 
In case the answer for Q7 is 2 (securitized) please proceed to Q8 and Q9!!!  
 
Q8 What threats do refugees brings? 
This part was developed in connection to Innes’ (2010) research in British Media, 
but with some changes in economic and societal context due to Indonesia serving 
as a transit country, thus having no economic benefit from the state provided to 
the refugees. Additional themes are supplemented from other research in transit 
state settings, as well as from first reading of articles and the pilot study. 
However, in consultation with the Huysmans (2000), the threats do not have to be 
directly pointed to refugees, but when they are “lumped” together with scary 
crimes; it is a sign of securitization (Hammerstad 2014).  
 
1. Traditional Physical threat 
1.1. Territory and Sovereignty   
1.2. Transnational crimes (drugs, smuggling, trafficking) 
1.3. Fraud documents 
1.4. Illegality  
1.5. Possible criminal  
1.6. Terrorism  
2. Economic threat  
2.1. Burden to welfare system  
2.2. Costing money to taking care of them 
2.3. Inflation  
2.4. Better off than local  
2.5. Residual problem therefore causing money  
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3. Societal threat  
3.1. identity  
3.2. religion  
3.3. social problems connected to religion  
3.4. bad rapport with local community  
4. Non-conclusive  
 
Q9. What solution is offered?  
1. Detention for refugees  
2. Deportation 
3. Increase resources (ranging from financial, manpower, and creating 
special body or task force) 
4. Increase surveillances 
5. Raid  
6. Border control (including visa regime)  
7. Severe punishment for people helping people smuggling 
8. Establishing processing center  
9. People provide information to government  
10. International cooperation 
11. Non conclusive  
(if there is no one, or no mentioned at all about the solution) 
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APPENDIX 2 
CODING SHEDULE  
Content	  Analysis	  Coding	  Schedule	  
Print	  Media’s	  Representations	  of	  Transit	  Forced	  Migrants	  in	  
Indonesia	  	  
Identifier:	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  Case	  Number	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   ☐☐☐	   	   	  Q1.	  Source	   	   	   	   	   	   ☐	 Q2.	  Date	   	   	   	   	   	   ☐☐☐☐-☐☐-☐☐	  	  	  Q3.	  Title	  	  	  	  	  
Questions:	  	  	  Q4.	  What	  is	  the	  type	  of	  the	  article?	   	   	   	   ☐	  
	 Q5.	  What	  label	  is	  used	  to	  portray	  refugees?	  	   	   ☐	 	  	  
Please	  be	  aware,	  questions	  Q6,	  Q7,	  Q8,	  Q9	  are	  connected.	  Please	  fill	  in	  
the	  boxes	  to	  correspond	  with	  the	  placement	  of	  the	  previous	  answer,	  in	  
example	  boxes	  1-­‐7.	  Please only code two digits.	  	  Q6.	  Who	  are	  the	  actors	  made	  statements?	  
	 	 	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 
 
Q7. In which themes, the statement can be categorized? 
	 	 	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐ 	  
In	  case	  of	  the	  answer	  for	  Q7	  is	  security	  issue,	  please	  proceed	  to	  the	  next	  
questions	  Q8	  and	  Q9.	  	  	  	  Q8.	  What	  threat	  is	  associated	  with	  transit	  forced	  migrants?	  
	 	 	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	 ☐☐	  	  Q9.	  What	  solution	  is	  provided?	   	   	   	  
	 	 	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	 ☐	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APPENDIX 3 
NEWS SAMPLES: INDOCHINESE REFUGEES 
Case 
Number 	   Source	   Date	   Titles	  
1	   Tempo magazine 	   1976-09-04	   Orang Vietnam di Natuna 	  
2	   Tempo magazine 	   1977-08-20	   Di Jakarta Berapa Lama?	  
3	   Tempo magazine 	   1979-01-06	   Tentang Beban Kemanusiaan Itu	  
4	   Tempo magazine 	   1979-01-13	   Kali Ini Perlente	  
5	   Tempo magazine 	   1979-02-24	   Pulau Pengungsi	  
6	   Tempo magazine 	   1979-03-17	   Mereka Bikin Pusing 	  
7	   Tempo magazine 	   1979-03-31	   Kita Bukan Tukang Tampung 	  
8 Tempo magazine  1979-04-21 Mereka Akan Dipulaukan 
9 Tempo magazine  1979-05-19 Penggalangan di Pulau Galang 
10 Tempo magazine  1979-05-26 Bagaimana Membuka dan  Menutup 
Kran  
11 Tempo magazine  1979-09-01 Jangan Sampai Jadi Kere 
12 Tempo magazine  1979-09-01 Lebih Senang Ketimbang Vietnam  
13 Tempo magazine  1979-09-22 Pintu-Pintu di Pejambon  
14 Tempo magazine  1980-03-01 Tanda Mata di Galang  
15 Tempo magazine  1981-08-01 Green dan Orang Kapal  
16 Tempo magazine  1990-05-05 Gelombang Rombeng Vietnam  
17 Tempo magazine  1990-05-19 Mengapa Mereka Mengadu Nyawa? 
18 Tempo magazine  1990-05-19 Galang Dalam Kenangan  
19 Tempo magazine  1990-05-19 Kisah Tinh Xu di Pulau Galang  
20 Tempo magazine  1990-06-23 Pulau Galang Nyaris Meledak  
21 Tempo magazine  1990-05-19 Apa yang Terjadi Kalau Mereka 
Terus Berdatangan? 
22 Tempo magazine  1994-05-14 Keresahan di Pulau Pengungsi 
23 Tempo magazine  1993-06-26 Pulanglah dari Galang  
24 Tempo magazine  1993-12-04 Malu Pulang, Susah di Galang 
25 Tempo magazine  1993-12-04 Susahnya ke Negara Ketiga 
26 Tempo magazine  1979-07-07 Unjuk Gigi Saja, Tak Usah Omong 
Perang 
27 Tempo magazine  1979-07-07 Bantulah Kami untuk Membantu 
Anda 
28 Tempo magazine  1979-06-23 Cahaya ´Jangan Datang` di Laut 
Indonesia 
29 Tempo magazine  1979-06-23 Mungkin Sesuatu Sedang Terjadi di 
Hanoi  
30 Kompas newspaper 1979-10-01  Dubes Kanada Diterima Presiden 
31 Kompas newspaper 1979-03-03 Mereka Imigran Gelap 
32 Kompas newspaper 1979-03-03 Patroli TNI AL di Laut Cina Selatan 
Ditingkatkan 
33 Kompas newspaper 1979-06-28 Memang Ada Ketidaksepakatan 
dengan Vietnam 
34 Kompas newspaper 1979-07-03 Timbul Perang atau Tidak RI Sudah 
Siap 
35 Kompas newspaper 1979-07-03 Jepang Tidak Segan Lagi Berperan 
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di Asia Tenggara dan Timur 
36 Kompas newspaper 1979-03-05 Indonesia Tetap Akan Sediakan 
Pulau  
37 Kompas newspaper 1979-08-04 Swedia Ambil 600 Pengungsi 
Vietnam di Indonesia 
38 Kompas newspaper 1979-07-06 Kerjasama di Laut Mencegah 
Masuknya Pengungsi Vietnam 
39 Kompas newspaper 1978-12-07 Indonesia Ikut Konferensi PBB Soal 
Pengungsi Vietnam 
40 Kompas newspaper 1978-12-05 Masih 2002 Pengungsi Vietnam di 
Indonesia 
41 Kompas newspaper 1979-10-08 265 Pengungsi Vietnam Menuju 
Jerman 
42 Kompas newspaper 1979-09-10 Presiden ke Pulau Galang Sebelum 
Kunjungi Singapura 
43 Kompas newspaper 1979-05-11  Australia Sedia Terima 1,000 
Pengungsi Vietnam dari Indonesia 
44 Kompas newspaper 1979-07-11 Tanggung Jawab Timbal-Balik 
Indonesia-Malaysia 
45 Kompas newspaper 1979-07-13 Kapal RS Perancis Akan Beroperasi 
di Jemaja 
46 Kompas newspaper 1979-06-12 Pengungsi Vietnam Ditolak Masuk 
Wilayah RI 
47 Kompas newspaper 1979-02-14 Sebuah Pulau di Indonesia 
Dipertimbangkan 
48 Kompas newspaper 1979-05-14 Negara-Negara Indocina Jangan 
Lupakan Tanggungjawabnya 
49 Kompas newspaper 1979-07-14 Indonesia Tidak Setuju Pengungsi 
Dihalau ke Laut 
50 Kompas newspaper 1979-05-16 Indonesia Perkirakan Dana P 
Galang 18.56 Juta Dolar 
51 Kompas newspaper 1979-07-17 Melautkan Para Pengungsi Secara 
Sepihak dan Tanpa Koordinasi 
52 Kompas newspaper 1979-06-18 Tak Perlu Kata-Kata Diplomasi Lagi 
53 Kompas newspaper 1979-07-18 Harus Diselesaikan dengan 
Mengikutsertakan Vietnam 
54 Kompas newspaper 1979-09-24 Sebuah RS Dibangun di P Galang 
55 Kompas newspaper 1979-07-13 DPR RI Parlemen Australia 
Bicarakan Pengungsi 
56 Kompas newspaper 1979-06-27 Perundingan Vietnam-Indonesia 
Tanpa Hasil Jelas 
57 Kompas newspaper 1978-10-20 Penampungan yang Baik dan Hidup 
yang Santai 
58 Kompas newspaper 1978-10-19 Pemerintah RI Minta Bantuan PBB 
untuk Menangani 1,000 Pengungsi 
Vietnam 
59 Kompas newspaper 1976-10-08 Pengungsi dari Vietnam ke Pulau 
Christmas 
60 Kompas newspaper 1975-06-18 Pojok Kompas 
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61 Kompas newspaper 1976-07-27 15 Pengungsi Vietnam Masih 
Dikarantina 
62 Kompas newspaper 1978-11-16 Indonesia Tak Bersedia Tampung 
Pengungsi Vietnam  
63 Kompas newspaper 1981-07-24 Green Pahami dan Hargai Sikap RI 
64 Kompas newspaper 1981-07-23 Presiden Beri Penjelasan Kepada 
Green 
65 Kompas newspaper 1981-01-14 Diselamatkan Nelayan Indonesia 
66 Kompas newspaper 1982-07-23 56 Pengungsi Vietnam Mendarat di 
Natuna 
67 Kompas newspaper 1983-08-09 Australia Sedia Tampung 50 Persen 
Pengungsi Vietnam di Asteng 
68 Kompas newspaper 1984-07-09 RI Tak Mungkin Deportasi Pengungsi 
ke Negeri Asalnya 
69 Kompas newspaper 1985-02-03 Di Pulau Galang Terdapat 10,000 
Pengungsi Vietnam 
70 Kompas newspaper 1986-05-20 Hubungan Australia Indonesia Lewat 
Pendekatan Lebih Pragmatis 
71 Kompas newspaper 1986-01-03 Vietnam Bersedia Memikirkan 
Masalah Pengungsi di RI 
72 Kompas newspaper 1990-05-03 Pengungsi Vietnam Tidak akan 
Diusir 
73 Kompas newspaper 1990-07-05 Vietnam Akan Berusaha Mencegah 
Pengungsi Ilegal 
74 Kompas newspaper 1990-07-30 AS Harapkan Pemrosesan Pengungsi 
Dipercepat 
75 Kompas newspaper 1991-11-23 Tak Cuma Soal Repatriasi 
76 Kompas newspaper 1993-03-02 Masalah Repatriasi Pengungsi dan 
Kebijakan Vietnam 
77 Kompas newspaper 1993-03-02 Repatriasi dan Hak Pulang ke Tanah 
Air 
78 Kompas newspaper 1993-06-12 Indonesia Minta Proses Repatriasi 
Dipercepat 
79 Kompas newspaper 1993-09-05 Indonesia Tak Pernah Berusaha 
Campuri Urusan Negara Lain 
80 Kompas newspaper 1993-09-21 Pengungsi Vietnam Siap Direpatriasi 
81 Kompas newspaper 1993-10-26 Bantuan Bagi Pengungsi Vietnam 
Terlalu Banyak 
82 Kompas newspaper 1994-04-27 Kunjungan Presiden Le Duc Anh dan 
Prospek Hubungan RI-Vietnam 
83 Kompas newspaper 1994-04-28 Vietnam Berniat Kosongkan Pulau 
Galang 
84 Kompas newspaper 1994-04-30 Pengungsi Vietnam Tewas Bakar Diri 
di Pulau Galang 
85 Kompas newspaper 1994-05-02 Pemulangan Pengungsi Vietnam 
Tidak Dengan Jalan Memaksa 
86 Kompas newspaper 1994-05-27 Repatriasi Pengungsi Vietnam Baru 
Rampung Agustus 1995 
87 Kompas newspaper 1994-07-02 Manusia Perahu Vietnam Terdampar 
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di Pulau Sabu 
88 Kompas newspaper 1996-04-03 Babak Terakhir Manusia Perahu 
89 Kompas newspaper 1996-05-31 Seluruh Manusia Perahu Akan 
Dipulangkan Selama Juni 
90 Kompas newspaper 1996-06-17 Manusia Perahu di Pulau Galang 
91 Kompas newspaper 1996-06-18 Memetik Apel di Rumah Nenek 
92 Kompas newspaper 1996-06-19 UNHCR: Tidak Ada Paksaan dari 
ABRI untuk Memulangkan Manusia 
Perahu 
93 Kompas newspaper 1996-09-10 Ditutup, Kamp Pengungsi di Pulau 
Galang  	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APPENDIX 4 
NEWS SAMPLES: NEW WAVES OF REFUGEES 	  
Case 
Number 	   Source	   Date	   Titles	  
94	   Tempo magazine	   2001-09-09	   Terjepit Dua Karang 	  
95	   Tempo magazine	   2001-11-04	   Jangan Ada Galang Kedua 	  
96	   Tempo magazine	   2001-11-04	   Karamnya Sebuah Harapan	  
97	   Tempo magazine	   2001-11-08	   Jerat Hukum Penyelundup	  
98	   Tempo magazine	   2001-12-16	   Siap Menyelundup Jika Nasib 
Meredup	  
99	   Tempo magazine	   2010-09-05	   Kandas di Suaka Penantian	  
100	   Tempo magazine	   2010-09-05	   Dibujuk Calo Asal Indonesia	  
101 Tempo magazine 2012-01-01 Kapal Imigran Karam 
102 Kompas newspaper 1998-03-25 Disinyalir Ada Jaringan Imigran 
Gelap 
103 Kompas newspaper 1998-07-22 Indonesia Jadi Tempat Transit 
Imigran Gelap 
104 Kompas newspaper 2001-03-07 Indonesia Menjadi Tujuan Imigran 
Gelap 
105 Kompas newspaper 2001-05-19 Imigran Gelap Ditangani Tim IOM 
106 Kompas newspaper 2001-08-29 Apa yang Sebaiknya Dilakukan 
Kepada Imigran Gelap dan 
Pengungsi? 
107 Kompas newspaper 2001-09-05 Trip Ilegal ke Pulau Pasir 
108 Kompas newspaper 2001-09-07 Indonesia Perlu Bangun Pusat 
Penahanan 
109 Kompas newspaper 2001-09-07 Hukuman Berat Bagi yang 
Memfasilitasi Imigran 
110 Kompas newspaper 2001-09-25 Indonesia Perlu Ratifikasi Konvensi 
Tentang Pengungsi 
111 Kompas newspaper 2001-10-26 Jusuf Kalla Soal Imigran Gelap 
112 Kompas newspaper 2001-10-27 Dua Anggota Polisi Terlibat 
Jaringan Penyelundup Imigran 
113 Kompas newspaper 2001-11-23 61 Imigran Gelap Asal Pakistan 
Masuk Jatim 
114 Kompas newspaper 2001-11-30 Dunia Kecam PM Howard Soal 
Imigrasi 
115 Kompas newspaper 2002-02-06 Makna Kunjungan PM Australia 
John Howard Masih Sulit Diukur 
116 Kompas newspaper 2002-02-28 Perlu Kerjasama Global 
Menghentikan Fenomena 
Penyelundupan Manusia 
117 Kompas newspaper 2004-09-30 Polisi Australia Minta Lima Imigran 
Gelap di Semarang Dideportasi 
118 Kompas newspaper 2006-06-10 107 migran Gelap Asal Srilanka 
Ditangkap di Vila 
119 Kompas newspaper 2006-11-28 Ditjen Imigrasi Tangkap 31 WNA 
Ilegal 
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120 Kompas newspaper 2009-03-28 Polisi Tanah 24 Imigran Gelap 
121 Kompas newspaper 2009-03-29 Imigran Gelap Afghanistan Masuk 
Wilayah RI Setelah Mampir di 
Malaysia 
122 Kompas newspaper 2009-04-12 40 WNA Dikirim Lewat Kepulauan 
Seribu 
123 Kompas newspaper 2009-04-18 Dari Negeri Konflik Mencari Damai 
124 Kompas newspaper 2009-04-19 Warga Jadi Terlunta-Lunta 
125 Kompas newspaper 2009-04-22 Penyalur Kabur dari Kejaran Polisi 
126 Kompas newspaper 2009-04-23 70 Warga Afganistan Direlokasi 
127 Kompas newspaper 2009-05-13 1031 Imigran Masuk Lewat Jalur 
Tikus 
128 Kompas newspaper 2009-05-15 Imigran Afganistan Kabur dari 
Tahanan 
129 Kompas newspaper 2009-05-20 10 Imigran Afganistan Kabur 
130 Kompas newspaper 2009-05-22 Aceh Tunggu Deplu 
131 Kompas newspaper 2009-06-19 Ribuan Imigran Gelap Masuki RI 
132 Kompas newspaper 2009-06-20 Ribuan Imigran Masuki RI 
133 Kompas newspaper 2009-06-25 Aru Jadi Jalur Baru Penyelundup 
134 Kompas newspaper 2009-06-27 WNI Bantu Perjalanan Imigran 
Gelap 
135 Kompas newspaper 2009-10-22 Deplu Verifikasi Imigran Srilanka 
136 Kompas newspaper 2009-10-27 Imigran Gelap Dibahas 
137 Kompas newspaper 2009-11-03 Indonesia Jangan Mau Jadi 
Pengaman Bagi Australia 
138 Kompas newspaper 2009-11-03 RI Minta Kedubes Srilanka Ikut 
Terlibat 
139 Kompas newspaper 2009-12-29 Imigran Gelap Mengaku Ingin 
Berwisata 
140 Kompas newspaper 2009-12-30 Imigran Gelap Ditampung Sementara 
141 Kompas newspaper 2010-03-27 17 Imigran Ditangkap 
142 Kompas newspaper 2010-04-30 Terlunta-Lunta Dalam Tarikan 
Kepentingan 
143 Kompas newspaper 2010-04-30 Jejak-Jejak Ketidakpastian 
144 Kompas newspaper 2010-04-30 Menegakkan Kedaulatan 
145 Kompas newspaper 2010-06-21 Pengungsi Bukan Imigran Gelap 
146 Kompas newspaper 2010-07-12 Empat Imigran Gelap Kabur 
147 Kompas newspaper 2010-09-19 Repotnya Mengurusi Warga Negara 
Lain 
148 Kompas newspaper 2010-10-13 Sebanyak 52 Tahanan Imigrasi 
Kabur 
149 Kompas newspaper 2010-10-18 85 WNA Ditangkap di Gunungkidul 
150 Kompas newspaper 2010-11-06 Australia Bantu Polda Bali 
151 Kompas newspaper 2011-03-14 Simalakama Menindak Imigran 
Gelap 
152 Kompas newspaper 2011-11-02 7 Imigran Tewas Tenggelam 
153 Kompas newspaper 2011-12-21 Pengungsi Korban Konflik 
154 Kompas newspaper 2011-10-23 Jenazah Imigran Terus Bertambah 
155 Kompas newspaper 2011-12-23 Dilema Imigran Gelap 
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156 Kompas newspaper 2011-12-24 Imigran Gelap 
157 Kompas newspaper 2012-02-10 Penyelundupan Manusia Meningkat 
158 Kompas newspaper 2012-03-08 TNI AL Tangkap Imigran di Batam 
159 Kompas newspaper 2012-05-15 Antara Kemanusiaan dan Ancaman 
Narkoba 
160 Kompas newspaper 2012-06-04 Kerjasama untuk Cegah Jatuh 
Korban 
161 Kompas newspaper 2012-09-05 Indonesia-Australia Bahas Kode Etik 
SAR 
162 Kompas newspaper 2013-06-28 Duri "Abadi" Hubungan Indonesia-
Australia 
163 Kompas newspaper 2013-08-22 Pembatalan Tak Akan Mempersulit 
164 Kompas newspaper 2013-08-28 Polisi Tangkap Sindikat Penyelundup 
Imigran 
165 Kompas newspaper 2013-10-12 Pemkot Malang Mendata Warga 
Negara Asing 
166 Kompas newspaper 2013-10-23 WNI Banyak Terlibat 
167 Tempo newspaper 2012-07-07 Imigran Gelap ke Indonesia 
Cenderung Meningkat 
168 Tempo newspaper 2013-09-13 Sulawesi Selatan Jadi Jalur Transit 
Imigran Gelap 
169 Tempo newspaper 2012-09-04 Anggota TNI Penyelundup Imigran 
Gelap Ditangkap 
170 Tempo newspaper 2012-04-12 Empat Orang Jadi Tersangka Kasus 
Imigran Gelap 
171 Tempo newspaper 2012-07-12 Polda Jawa Timur Tangkap 25 
Imigran Gelap 
172 Tempo newspaper 2013-09-26 Imigran Gelap Pakai Puluhan Jalur 
Tikur di Riau 
173 Tempo newspaper 2013-07-27 Empat Orang Jadi Tersangka 
Tenggelamnya Kapal Imigran Gelap 
174 Tempo newspaper 2012-10-10 Lima Oknum TNI Penyelundup 
Imigran Gelap 
175 Tempo newspaper 2011-10-24 46 Imigran Gelap Tertangkap di 
Karanganyar 
176 Tempo newspaper 2012-11-12 Kepulauan Seribu Kewalahan 
Hadapi Imigran Gelap 
177 Tempo newspaper 2013-11-19 Tiga Oknum TNI AL Diduga 
Selundupkan Imigran 
178 Tempo newspaper 2011-10-20 17 Imigran Gelap Ditangkap di 
Pantai Kukup 
179 Tempo newspaper 2013-11-20 Biaya Imigran ke Australia Rp 15 
Juta 
180 Tempo newspaper 2013-07-30 Warga Negara India Diduga Jadi 
Otak Penyelundup Imigran 
181 Tempo newspaper 2013-07-03 Imigran Gelap Timur Tengah 
Berulah 
182 Tempo newspaper 2012-11-16 Polisi Cokok 35 Imigran Asal Irak 
183 Tempo newspaper 2012-09-12 Penyelundup Imigran Dituntut 8 
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Tahun Penjara 
184 Tempo newspaper 2012-09-28 38 Imigran Ditangkap Saat Sewa 
Perahu 
185 Tempo newspaper 2013-04-15 4 Orang Terlibat Penyelundup 
Imigran 
186 Tempo newspaper 2013-06-08 100 Imigran Timur Tengah 
Dievakuasi ke Cilacap 
187 Tempo newspaper 2013-11-08 Imigran Mabuk Acak-Acak Masjid 
188 Tempo newspaper 2013-09-09 Imigran Kembali Tangkap 106 
Pengungsi 
189 Tempo newspaper 2009-04-17 Imigran Gelap 
190 Tempo newspaper 2012-08-31 Kapal Pengangkut 150 Imigran 
Tenggelam 
191 Tempo newspaper 2013-04-18 Polisi Tangkap Lagi 9 Imigran 
Rohingya 
192 Tempo newspaper 2011-10-22 Imigran Asal Afghanistan Diduga 
Tak Lari Jauh 
193 Tempo newspaper 2013-05-13 95 Pencari Suaka Australia 
Ditangkap di Bali 
194 Tempo newspaper 2004-01-11 Imigran Afganistan Protes Jahit 
Mulut 
195 Tempo newspaper 2010-07-26 Polisi Kembali Tangkap 21 Imigran 
Afganistan 
196 Tempo newspaper 2004-10-05 Imigran Asal Afganistan Dihajar 
Warga 
197 Tempo newspaper 2010-10-04 Kemungkinan Adanya Sindikat 
Imigran Diselidiki 
198 Tempo newspaper 2010-10-19 Pantai Gunungkidul Jadi Lokasi 
Penyeberangan Imigran Gelap 
199 Tempo newspaper 2011-12-22 Diduga Terlibat Menyelundupkan 
Imigran 
200 Tempo newspaper 2009-05-22 Bobol Teralis, 10 Imigran Afganistan 
Kabur 
201 Tempo newspaper 2010-04-07 37 Imigran Afganistan Ditangkap 
202 Tempo newspaper 2010-03-24 Imigrasi Kupang Kesulitan Deportasi 
Imigran 
203 Tempo newspaper 2009-10-16 Imigran Srilanka Sakit 
204 Tempo newspaper 2009-12-31  Asal Afganistan Bertambah 
205 Tempo newspaper 2010-11-23 Dua Imigran Gelap Afganistan 
Ditangkap 
206 Tempo newspaper 2009-10-14 Puluhan Imigran Srilanka Sakit 
207 Tempo newspaper 2012-08-14 Sembunyikan Ratusan Imigran, Dua 
Rumah di Sentul Digrebeg 
208 Tempo newspaper 2013-06-22 Pelanggaran Hak Anak Pencari 
Suaka 
209 Tempo newspaper 2011-10-31 Petugas IOM Periksa Imigran Gelap 
di Surakarta 
210 Tempo newspaper 2013-09-29 Imigran Diduga Mengemudikan 
Kapal Sendiri 
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211 Tempo newspaper 2013-03-19 Imigran Ilegal di Kawasan Asia-
Pasifik Meningkat Tajam 
212 Tempo newspaper 2013-06-24 Imigran Gelap Mengelabui Aparat 
Dengan Naik Truk 
213 Tempo newspaper 2009-02-08 Indonesia Kirim Tim Klarifikasi 
214 Tempo newspaper 2009-10-23 78 Imigran Diamankan 
215 Tempo newspaper 2010-04-08 205 Imigran Gelap Direlokasi 
216 Tempo newspaper 2001-09-05 Polri Akui Terima Dana Australia 	  	  	  
